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Note
Liberty and Just [Compensation] for All: Wrongful
Conviction as a Fifth Amendment Taking
KELLY SHEA DELVAC
In the United States, over 2,900 people have been exonerated for crimes they
did not commit. While some exonerees currently qualify for compensation for their
wrongful convictions, less than 40% have received any type of financial support.
This Note examines the history of wrongful convictions in America as well as the
historical background of the Fifth Amendment. It then looks at the current
compensation schemes available to exonerees and analyzes the evolution of takings
jurisprudence. This Note argues that a wrongful conviction is a taking of an
exoneree’s labor under the Fifth Amendment and, therefore, constitutionally entitles
an exoneree to just compensation.
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Liberty and Just [Compensation] for All: Wrongful
Conviction as a Fifth Amendment Taking
KELLY SHEA DELVAC *
INTRODUCTION
Judge Learned Hand remarked that our system of justice “has been
always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal
dream.”1 Throughout Judge Hand’s lifetime, there were at least 230 known
exonerations in America.2 Today, there are over 130 exonerations each
year.3 Of these exonerees, less than 40% have received any type of

*
2021 J.D. graduate of Pepperdine Law. This Note is dedicated to my exonerated friends David,
Derrick, and Alex who encourage me to do better every day. To Prof. James McGoldrick who encouraged
us to see where the law led to ridiculous results and challenged us to fix it. Special thanks to my husband,
Bill, and to Professors Robert Pushaw and Shelley Saxer for their comments and edits to this Note. I
would also like to thank the members of the Connecticut Law Review for careful editing and feedback.
All errors are my own.
1
United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). Judge Hand lived from 1872 to 1961.
GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 1, 585 (2d ed. 2011).
2
Exonerations before 1989, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/speci
al/exoneration/Pages/ExonerationsBefore1989.aspx?View={43e04d15-8918-459f-bb8f-dddc168edf0d}
&SortField=Exonerated&SortDir=Asc (last visited Feb. 19, 2020) (“The National Registry of
Exonerations . . . . provides detailed information about every known exoneration in the United States
since 1989—cases in which a person was wrongly convicted of a crime and later cleared of all the charges
based on new evidence of innocence. The Registry also maintains a more limited database of known
exonerations prior to 1989.”).
3
Exonerations by Year: DNA and Non-DNA, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS,
www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exoneration-by-Year.aspx (last visited Feb. 3, 2020);
see also Glossary, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneratio
n/Pages/glossary.aspx (last visited Jan. 7, 2020) (“In general, an exoneration occurs when a person who
has been convicted of a crime is officially cleared based on new evidence of innocence . . . . More
precise[ly,] . . . . [a] person has been exonerated if he or she was convicted of a crime and, following a
post-conviction re-examination of the evidence in the case, was either: (1) declared to be factually
innocent by a government official or agency with the authority to make that declaration; or (2) relieved
of all the consequences of the criminal conviction by a government official or body with the authority to
take that action. The official action may be: (i) a complete pardon by a governor or other competent
authority, whether or not the pardon is designated as based on innocence; (ii) an acquittal of all charges
factually related to the crime for which the person was originally convicted; or (iii) a dismissal of all
charges related to the crime for which the person was originally convicted, by a court or by a prosecutor
with the authority to enter that dismissal. The pardon, acquittal, or dismissal must have been the result,
at least in part, of evidence of innocence that either (i) was not presented at the trial at which the person
was convicted; or (ii) if the person pled guilty, was not known to the defendant and the defense attorney,
and to the court, at the time the plea was entered. The evidence of innocence need not be an explicit basis
for the official action that exonerated the person. A person who otherwise qualifies has not been
exonerated if there is unexplained physical evidence of that person’s guilt.”).
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compensation for the time they spent wrongfully imprisoned. This reality is
because “exoneration guarantees only one thing—release from prison.”5
The case of Nathan Myers and Clifford Williams exemplifies this
injustice.6 In 1976, Williams and Myers were convicted of the murder of
Jeannette Williams and the attempted murder of Nina Marshall.7 They were
sentenced⎯Myers to life in prison, and Williams to death.8 They served
forty-three years in prison before being exonerated in 2019.9 Under Florida’s
Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act,10 Myers received $2
million.11 Williams, however, was ineligible for any financial benefits
because Florida law excludes exonerees who have more than one prior
felony conviction, and Williams had two.12 These men were accused of the
same crimes, served the same forty-three years in prison, both innocent, but
one received $2 million, while the other received nothing.13 This disparity in
compensation among exonerees is not an anomaly.14
Today, wrongful convictions are heavily covered in the media, with
stories prevalent in today’s pop culture.15 It is this publicity that has led
states, legislatures, and courts to make great strides in working towards
developing compensation statutes, private bills, and civil actions to
compensate these exonerees for the years taken from them.16 However,
4
Simon Cole, Compensation for Exonerees, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS 2 (Sept. 11, 2017),
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Compensation%20for%20Exonerees%20P
rimer.pdf.
5
Making up for Lost Time: What the Wrongfully Convicted Endure and How to Provide Fair
Compensation, INNOCENCE PROJECT 9–10 (2016) [hereinafter Lost Time], https://www.innocenceproje
ct.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/innocence_project_compensation_report-6.pdf.
6
Seth Miller, Opinion, Wrongful Convictions Show Need for Criminal Justice Reform, SARASOTA
HERALD-TRIBUNE (Oct. 6, 2019, 6:08 AM), https://www.heraldtribune.com/opinion/20191006/millerwrongful-convictions-show-need-for-criminal-justice-reform.
7
Id. See Clifford Williams, Jr., NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/sp
ecial/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=5533 (last visited Feb. 1, 2020), for further information
on this case.
8
Miller, supra note 6.
9
Id.
10
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 961.01–.07 (West 2013).
11
Miller, supra note 6.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
See generally Cole, supra note 4.
15
Innocence Staff, Must-See Wrongful Conviction Films and TV Shows, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Oct.
28,
2016),
https://www.innocenceproject.org/wrongful-conviction-media/
(listing
thirteen
documentaries, eight television episodes, and eight movies about wrongful convictions); Ten Great
Books of the Decade, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Dec. 31, 2009), https://www.innocenceproject.org/ten-greatbooks-of-the-decade/. See Actual Innocence, APPLE PODCASTS, https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/
actual-innocence/id1102237078 (last visited Feb. 2, 2020); Jason Flom, Wrongful Conviction Podcast,
LAVA, https://www.wrongfulconvictionpodcast.com/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2020); Season 1, SERIAL
PODCAST, https://serialpodcast.org/season-one (last visited Feb. 2, 2020); TRUTH & JUST. PODCAST WITH
BOB RUFF, https://www.truthandjusticepod.com/home (last visited Feb. 2, 2020), for podcasts on
wrongful convictions.
16
See infra Part II (discussing current compensation framework).
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unfortunately, many exonerees still do not qualify for compensation under
any of the current avenues.17
A possible remedy to this lack of compensation is the enforcement of
the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.18 The Takings Clause provides that a
person shall not “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”19 Plainly stated, this means the government is allowed to
take private property as long as it either provides due process or just
compensation for that taking. The Supreme Court has held that just
compensation means a property owner “is entitled to be put in as good a
position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken.”20
A wrongful conviction is an infringement on an individual’s liberty and
property rights that the safeguards of due process failed to protect.21
However, a wrongful conviction is also an illustration of how due process,
borne out a second time in the post-conviction appeals process, can remedy
the continued deprivation of the exoneree’s liberty rights.22 But it is just
compensation that is the constitutionally required remedy for the taking of
the exoneree’s property rights—in this case, the exoneree’s labor while
wrongfully imprisoned.23
An exoneree’s labor was “taken” by due process when he was
convicted.24 Nevertheless, when that due process proves to have resulted in
an unjust result, the exoneree’s labor taken by that injustice must now be
compensated for.25 The Fifth Amendment demands this payment because
the amendment “bar[s] Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole.”26
This Note argues that a wrongful conviction has done just that: required
one person alone to bear a burden that, “in all fairness and justice, should be
17

See Cole, supra note 4, at 3–4.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
19
Id. For further reading on the history and original intent of the Fifth Amendment Taking Clause,
see William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political
Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995).
20
Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934).
21
Infra Section III.A.
22
See Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 1257 (2017) (“[T]he restoration of liberty on reversal
of a conviction is not compensation . . . .”).
23
Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2172 (2019) (“Compensation under the Takings Clause
is a remedy for the ‘constitutional violation’ that ‘the [owner] has already suffered’ at the time of the
uncompensated taking.” (quoting San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 654 (1981)
(Brennan, J., dissenting))).
24
U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also id. amend. XIII, § 1 (allowing slavery or involuntary servitude
where a party has been duly convicted).
25
See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2172.
26
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). The argument of this Note relies heavily on
this concept that individuals should not individually bear the public’s burden, specifically when due
process has been proven faulty. See infra Part III.
18
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borne by the public as a whole.” It argues that a wrongful conviction is a
taking under the Fifth Amendment and, therefore, an exoneree is
constitutionally entitled to just compensation.28 Part I traces the history of
wrongful convictions in America and its impact on society.29 It also provides
historical background on the Fifth Amendment, from the views of the
Constitutional Framers on property to how the Supreme Court has developed
its jurisprudence in this area.30 Part II provides the current status of wrongful
conviction compensation schemes.31 Part III analyzes the structure of the
Fifth Amendment,32 how the Supreme Court recognizes takings, and how
wrongful convictions fit into that framework.33 Part IV looks at the impact
recognizing a wrongful conviction as a taking would have on the legislature,
society, and the criminal justice system as a whole. 34 The last Part
concludes.35
27

27

See infra Part III.
Id. This Note specifically limits the discussion to the recognition of a wrongful conviction as a
taking and does not discuss the factors that would be included to decide what monetarily just
compensation would or could be. See id. (analyzing how wrongful convictions are a taking under the
Fifth Amendment). But see Erik Encarnacion, Why and How to Compensate Exonerees, 114 MICH. L.
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 139, 149–51 (2016) [hereinafter Why and How] (explaining what just
compensation might look like based on income of similarly situated professions). This argument is not
intended to be the most desirable avenue for compensation for all exonerees; it is specific to exonerees
unable to qualify under other compensation schemes and, by the constitutional language, is limited to a
remedy of just compensation. See infra Part II (reviewing how compensation schemes qualify and
disqualify people for compensation); see also Katrina Miriam Wyman, The Measure of Just
Compensation, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 239 (2007) (examining the limits of a just compensation remedy).
A further limitation on this Note is that this argument will focus on a takings action under the federal
Constitution, as opposed to arguing similar causes of action that may be available under each state
Constitution. See John Joseph Wallis, The NBER/Maryland State Constitutions Project: Completed State
Constitutions, NBER/UNIV. MD. STATE CONSTS. PROJECT, www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu/index.aspx
(last visited Feb. 26, 2021) (providing a searchable platform for the texts of every state constitution.).
Today, all but two state Constitutions have a Takings Clause that give at least the same level of protection
as the federal clause, if not more. See Donna M. Nakagiri, Takings Provisions in State Constitutions: Do
They Provide Greater Protections of Private Property than the Federal Takings Clause?, 1 (Jan. 1, 1999)
(J.D. fellowship essay, Michigan State University College of Law) (on file with the Michigan State
University College of Law), https://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&co
ntext=king (“[M]ost state constitutions are permeated with protections for private property and . . . most
state takings provisions have additional language that provides a basis for greater protection of private
property under state constitutions as compared to the federal Takings Clause.”). The two states that do
not have a dedicated takings clause are Kansas and North Carolina, each of which grants similar
protection in court precedent that has given each state a common law tradition of handling takings claims
just as the federal clause does. Id. at 18 n.121.
29
See infra Section I.A (explaining both the history and impact of wrongful convictions).
30
See infra Section I.B (discussing the drafting of the Takings Clause through to the modern
jurisprudence).
31
See infra Part II (examining the current state of the law for wrongful convictions compensation).
32
See infra Section III.A (analyzing Fifth Amendment construction).
33
See infra Section III.B (arguing wrongful conviction as an inverse condemnation taking).
34
See infra Part IV (discussing the impact this ruling would have on exonerees, society, and the
legal system).
35
See infra Conclusion (concluding the argument that a wrongful conviction should be ruled as an
inverse condemnation Taking).
28
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I. WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
There are two historical paths to walk to grasp the relevant legal issues
of this argument.36 The first path looks at criminal law, the problem of
wrongful convictions, and what compensation for the wrongly convicted
currently looks like. 37 The second traces the history as well as the
jurisprudential evolution of the Takings Clause.38 These two paths intertwine
through the concept of property and the rights that come with it. 39
A. Wrongful Convictions
1. History of American Wrongful Convictions
Even before America became a sovereign nation, wrongful convictions
had already occurred on its shores with the first case reported in 1673.40
When Thomas Cornell Jr.’s mother died, her death was first ruled an
accident.41 However, Thomas was later accused of murdering her.42 He was
convicted, in part, on the testimony of an uncle who said he had dreams of
Thomas murdering his mother and was visited by her ghost, accusing him
of the crime.43 Thomas was executed for the murder.44
Subsequently, the first recorded wrongful conviction after America
became a nation occurred in 1806, but the legal exoneration did not happen
until 1984.45 Dominic Daley and James Halligan were sentenced to death
and executed for the murder of Marcus Lyon.46
There were many problems in this case.47 For example, Daley and
Halligan were given defense attorneys only forty-eight hours before their
trial; the citizen who captured them was paid $500;48 they were the only
minority visitors in town; they were convicted within minutes; and they were
executed the next day.49 In 1984, Governor Michael Dukakis issued a legal

36
See infra Part I (tracing the history of the Takings Clause as well as the history of wrongful
convictions).
37
See infra Section I.A (explaining the history of wrongful convictions).
38
See infra Section I.B (discussing the history and jurisprudence of the Takings Clause).
39
See infra Sections I.A–B.
40
ELAINE FORMAN CRANE, KILLED STRANGELY: THE DEATH OF REBECCA CORNELL 1–2 (2002).
41
Id. at 17.
42
Id. at 28, 48.
43
Id. at 17–26.
44
Id. at 57–58.
45
The Daley & Halligan Bicentennial Commemoration, HISTORIC NORTHAMPTON MUSEUM &
EDUC. CTR., http://www.historic-northampton.org/daleyandhalligan/daleyandhalligan.html (last visited
Nov. 27, 2021).
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
$500 in 1805 is equivalent to $11,060.33 in 2020. CPI INFLATION CALCULATOR,
https://www.officialdata.org/us/inflation/1805?amount=500 (last visited Feb. 18, 2021).
49
HISTORIC NORTHAMPTON MUSEUM & EDUC. CTR., supra note 45.
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50

pardon to Halligan and Daley, 179 years after their execution. Never was
the maxim “the delay of justice, is great injustice” more poignant.51
Today, the National Registry of Exonerations keeps a current record of
every modern exoneration since 1989.52 As of this writing, there have been
more than 2,900 modern exonerations.53 Those exonerees total more than
25,600 years of wrongful incarceration—an average of nine years per
exoneree.54 Over forty of those exonerees were incarcerated for thirty years
or more.55
What was once a hidden risk of the American justice system of which
Judge Learned Hand spoke is hardly in the shadows any longer.56 Today’s
airwaves are inundated with media reports of wrongful convictions on the
news, social media, podcasts, and websites.57 Pop culture has also picked up
on the trend with books, television shows, and movies. 58 Perhaps, if Judge
Hand lived today, he would have called wrongful convictions a real and
present nightmare instead of an “unreal dream.”59
2. Impact of Wrongful Conviction
“It’s impossible to fully grasp the magnitude of the injustice
and suffering these [exoneration] numbers represent: careers
50

Id.
JOHN MUSGRAVE, ANOTHER WORD TO THE WISE, SHEWING THAT THE DELAY OF JUSTICE, IS
GREAT INJUSTICE 1 (1646). See Fred Shapiro, You Can Quote Them: “Justice Delayed is Justice
Denied”, YALE ALUMNI MAG. (Sept./Oct. 2010), https://yalealumnimagazine.com/articles/2967-youcan-quote-them, for further reading on historic uses of this phrase.
52
NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx
(last visited Mar. 14, 2020).
53
Exonerations Total by Year, NAT’L REGISTRTY EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/spe
cial/exoneration/Pages/Exonerations-in-the-United-States-Map.aspx (last visited Dec. 21, 2021). The
first year the registry started an accurate compilation of exonerations was 1989. Id.
54
Id. While an average may be instructive for the big picture of the problem of wrongful
convictions—and is indeed why it is being used here—it is wise to remember that these are not just
numbers but years of a person's life. See infra Section I.A.2.i.
55
Exonerations in 2018, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS 9 (Apr. 9, 2019), http://www.law.umi
ch.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations%20in%202018.pdf.
56
See United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (“Our [system of justice] has been
always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream.”).
57
Ames Grawert, Wrongful Convictions, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.bren
nancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/wrongful-convictions; see also JENNIFER THOMPSON-CANNINO,
RONALD COTTON & ERIN TORNEO, PICKING COTTON: OUR MEMOIR OF INJUSTICE AND REDEMPTION 93
(2009) (“On January 18, 1985, I [Ronald Cotton] was sentenced to life in prison plus fifty years. I stood
there as the judge read my sentence. He called me one of the most dangerous men he had ever met; the
district attorney said I was a ‘menace to society.’ I could scarcely look at anyone, but I caught a glimpse
of my mom and some of my sisters who were able to make it to court that day. They were stunned, like
someone had just slapped them. I pinched my right arm as hard as I could. The crescent indent marks on
my skin appeared just as the court officers moved in to take me away: This was a nightmare I couldn’t
wake up from.”).
58
See supra note 15 (listing current movies, television shows, books, and podcasts about wrongful
convictions).
59
Garsson, 291 F. at 649.
51
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and opportunities that were lost forever; children who grew up
and parents who died while the innocent defendants were in
prison; marriages that fell apart—or never happened.”60
i.

Impact on Exonerees

Financial consequences impact every exoneree, from lost wages to legal
bills, compiled from the time of accusation through exoneration.61
Increasing the financial blow, many exonerees were wrongfully convicted
when they were young and imprisoned, while their peers were finishing their
education and building their careers.62 This creates educational and work
history deficits that most exonerees can never surmount.63
Adding insult to injury, services that are available to parolees—people
who actually committed crimes, served their sentences, and are then
released—such as job placement, temporary housing, and medical care—are
generally not available to exonerees.64 This is particularly problematic
because these services provide a safety net for released prisoners to get back
on their feet and reintegrate into society as active, productive members.65
Exonerees are especially vulnerable at this reintegration stage because they
face all the same struggles of reacclimating to life outside prison that

60
Milestone: Exonerated Defendants Spent 20,000 Years in Prison, NAT’L REGISTRY
EXONERATIONS (2018), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/NRE.20000.Years.
Report.pdf. See Sion Jenkins, Secondary Victims and the Trauma of Wrongful Conviction: Families and
Children’s Perspectives on Imprisonment, Release and Adjustment, 46 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY
119, 123–27 (2013) (reporting the effects of parental incarceration on the children of exonerees).
61
See Lost Time, supra note 5, at 9 (“After serving nearly 10 years in prison for a crime he didn’t
commit, David Shephard’s wages were garnished for failing to pay child support because his girlfriend
and their son had been on welfare for a year while he was away. Larry Peterson was expected to
retroactively pay for his own public defender. The New Jersey Public Defender’s Office put a lien . . .
on Peterson to pay for the cost of representing him. Peterson had to undergo litigation to have the lien
removed.” (footnote omitted)).
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 10.
65
Id. David Shepherd was exonerated after spending ten years in prison for a crime he did not
commit and then was turned away from four different agencies that provide services for ex-offenders. Id.
at 9–10. The agencies told him “he could not receive their services since he had not committed a crime.”
Id. at 10.
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66

parolees do, but with the added psychological trauma of being wrongfully
imprisoned and without the added structural support.67
Also compounding the situation is that exoneration does not
automatically provide expungement,68 which typically requires a separate
time-consuming and costly legal proceeding.69 Practically speaking, this
means that when an exoneree applies for housing or a job, the conviction—
but not the exoneration—will show up on a background check.70 At best, this
leads to an uncomfortable conversation; at worst, the exoneree will not be
considered for the opportunity at all and will never get a chance to explain.71
An exoneree faces further hurdles in the form of detrimental effects from
prison life, which often provokes and normalizes criminal behavior.72 This
66

See Adrian Grounds, Psychological Consequences of Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment,
46 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 165, 171 (2004) (finding that the exonerees “had marked
and embarrassing difficulties in coping with ordinary practical tasks in the initial days and weeks—for
example, crossing busy roads and going into shops. Some had more persistent difficulties (not knowing,
for example, how to work central heating, TV remote controls, videos, credit cards, or cashpoints at
banks) and experienced shame that prevented them from asking for help. One said, ‘It’s like when
someone has a stroke; you have to be taught how to do things again.’ He felt humiliated by his lack of
ability and the fact that his wife had to teach him elementary skills. The men also typically had little
sense of the value of money, had difficulty budgeting, spent recklessly, and got into debt.”).
67
Id. at 167–70 (finding evidence of long-term personality changes, PTSD, and other psychiatric
disorders in exonerees specifically not found in parolees; the prison sentences for this study group ranged
from nine months to nineteen years; all of the subjects had no psychological issues before incarceration).
The long-term psychological effects found in this study were similar to the psychological effects found
in war veterans. Id. at 175. These psychological consequences were found to be specific to long-term
imprisonment coupled with the miscarriage of justice. Id. at 176 (“The miscarriage of justice typically
entailed acute psychological trauma at the time of initial arrest and custody, involving experiences of
overwhelming threat. In addition, there was chronic psychological trauma: years of notoriety, fear, and
isolation in their claims of innocence. Most spent years preoccupied in pursuing their case, despite
knowing or believing that they would never be released on parole as long as they refused to admit their
guilt. Additional features specific to the wrongfully convicted were the absence of preparation for release
and of post-release statutory support. The long-term imprisonment entailed psychological adaptation to
prison, as well as losses – separations from loved ones, missed life opportunities, the loss of a generation
of family life, for some, and of years of their expected personal life history.”).
68
See Lost Time, supra note 5, at 10–11 (“Exoneree Keith Turner says, ‘I keep a copy of my pardon
on me. Every job, you have to explain yourself. You have to put it on there—rape conviction—because
they check it. I always write, “I’ll explain at the interview.”’ Not all exonerees have a pardon to show;
many resort to carrying a news article about their exoneration.”).
69
Id. at 10.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 11 (“Many employers are not willing to take a chance on hiring someone who has been in
prison—innocent or not. ‘You would be surprised at how many people don’t know what exoneration is,’
Calvin Willis says. ‘The thing of it is that you’ve been to prison. You’ve been exposed. Being free is one
thing, but you’ve also experienced being around the criminalistic environment. That right there is like
you been contaminated.’”).
72
See generally Francis T. Cullen, Cheryl Lero Johnson & Daniel S. Nagin, Prisons Do Not Reduce
Recidivism: The High Cost of Ignoring Science, 91 PRISON J. 48S (2011); Paul Nieuwbeerta, Daniel S.
Nagin & Arjan A. J. Blokland, Assessing the Impact of First-Time Imprisonment on Offenders’
Subsequent Criminal Career Development: A Matched Samples Comparison, 25 J. QUANTITATIVE
CRIMINOLOGY 227 (2009); G. Matthew Snodgrass, Arjan A. J. Blokland, Amelia Haviland, Paul
Nieuwbeerta & Daniel S. Nagin, Does the Time Cause the Crime? An Examination of the Relationship
Between Time Served and Reoffending in the Netherlands, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 1149 (2011).
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exposure and acclimatization to prison life increases the risk that an
exoneree will commit a crime after the exoneree is freed. 73 All of these
challenges create an almost insurmountable barrier to the exoneree’s ability
to rebuild his life—a life taken by the government ostensibly intended to
protect the public good.74
ii.

Impact on Society

Blackstone said, “[I]t is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that
one innocent suffer.”75 When someone is falsely convicted, it is not just that
person who suffers, but society as well.76 The harms include a more
dangerous society, revictimization of victims, and financial costs to the
justice system.77
Wrongful convictions make society less safe.78 First and foremost, they
leave the real perpetrators free to commit more crimes.79 Moreover, because
the purpose of our criminal justice system is to deter crime specifically for
the public good, when wrongful convictions occur it sends a message that
criminals get away, and crime goes unpunished, thus diminishing the
73

See generally Evan J. Mandery, Amy Shlosberg, Valerie West & Bennett Callaghan,
Compensation Statutes and Post-Exoneration Offending, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 553 (2013)
(discussing recidivism in the exoneree population).
74
See Press Release, Sen. Mark R. Warner, Warner, Cornyn Introduce Bill to Extend Tax Relief
Deadline for Wrongfully Convicted (May 22, 2017), https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/
2017/5/warner-cornyn-introduce-bill-to-extend-tax-relief-deadline-for-wrongfully-convicted (“These
are people who, through no fault of their own, were wrongfully convicted by the government.”).
75
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352. This has come to be known as the Blackstone
ratio. See Blackstone Ratio, OXFORD REFERENCE, https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/a
uthority.20110803095510389 (last visited Feb. 26, 2021) (“The ratio of 10:1 expressed in the maxim
‘Better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.’”).
76
See Daniel Bier, Quote Files: John Adams on Innocence, Guilt, and Punishment, SKEPTICAL
LIBERTARIAN (Aug. 11, 2014), https://blog.skepticallibertarian.com/2014/08/11/quote-files-john-adams
-on-innocence-guilt-and-punishment/ (quoting John Adams’s opening statement for the Defense in the
1770 murder trial of eight British soldiers after the Boston Massacre: “We are to look upon it as more
beneficial, that many guilty persons should escape unpunished, than one innocent person should suffer.
The reason is, because it’s of more importance to community, that innocence should be protected, than
it is, that guilt should be punished; for guilt and crimes are so frequent in the world, that all of them
cannot be punished; and many times they happen in such a manner, that it is not of much consequence
to the public, whether they are punished or not. But when innocence itself, is brought to the bar and
condemned, especially to die, the subject will exclaim, it is immaterial to me, whether I behave well or
ill; for virtue itself, is no security. And if such a sentiment as this, should take place in the mind of the
subject, there would be an end to all security what so ever.”).
77
See supra Section I.A.1.i.
78
See infra Section I.A.1.ii.
79
See generally THOMPSON-CANNINO ET AL., supra note 57, at 130–33 (explaining that when
Ronald Cotton was imprisoned for a rape that Bobby Poole perpetrated, Poole was free to subsequently
commit twenty more crimes including robberies, burglaries, and rape before he was finally caught and
convicted of one of those subsequent crimes). See also Frank R. Baumgartner, Amanda Grigg, Rachelle
Ramírez & J. Sawyer Lucy, The Mayhem of Wrongful Liberty: Documenting the Crimes of True
Perpetrators in Cases of Wrongful Incarceration, 81 ALB. L. REV. 1263, 1264–65 (2017/2018)
[hereinafter Wrongful Liberty] (documenting cases where subsequent crimes were committed by
perpetrators who were free because others were falsely convicted of their previous crimes).
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80

deterrent effect of the entire system. This, in turn, decreases public
confidence in the criminal justice system.81 Further, recidivism in the
exoneree population is high, possibly showing that imprisonment of an
innocent person creates criminal conduct in people otherwise not
predisposed to that behavior. 82
Wrongful convictions also cost society financially.83 Costs include those
associated with trial and appeals, prison housing, and, in some cases,
compensation for wrongful convictions.84 Even the most aggressive,
tough-on-crime advocates admit that the statistics prove wrongful
convictions put an undue strain on state budgets.85
Wrongful convictions also revictimize the victims of the original crime
and their families.86 First, a crime occurs, and the victim must go through
the trauma of a trial, which may end in a conviction.87 However, in the case
80
See generally Nuno Garoupa & Matteo Rizzolli, Wrongful Convictions Do Lower Deterrence,
168 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 224 (2012).
81
See generally Marvin Zalman, Matthew J. Larson & Brad Smith, Citizens’ Attitudes Toward
Wrongful Convictions, 37 CRIM. JUST. REV. 51 (2012).
82
Recidivism is “[a] tendency to relapse into a habit of criminal activity or behavior.” Recidivism,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). This term is problematic for exonerees, however, because
they are not committing a crime again, but are merely committing a crime after imprisonment. See
generally Mandery et al., supra note 73 (discussing recidivism in the exoneree population). That being
said, for efficiency, the term will be used here to refer to an exoneree committing a crime after
exoneration. This cycle illustrates the quintessential “but for” causation first year law students are taught
to seek out. But-for Test, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/but-for_test. (last visited
Feb. 26, 2021). “But for” the wrongful conviction and imprisonment of this innocent person, this person
would have never committed a crime now. See generally id. See generally Mandery et al., supra note 73
(showing lack of resources leads to recidivism); Bier, supra note 76 (stating when innocent men know
they will be punished whether or not they commit a crime, they are more apt to commit a crime); Cullen
et al., supra note 72 (analyzing how prisons normalize and create more criminal behavior), for theories
on why recidivism in the exoneree population happens.
83
See generally Erik Kain, The High Cost of Wrongful Convictions, FORBES (June 29, 2011,
12:25 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2011/06/29/the-high-cost-of-wrongful-convictions/
(reporting on a study that found from 1989 to 2010 Illinois had eighty-five exonerations that cost Illinois
$214 million); Rebecca Silbert, John Hollway & Darya Larizadeh, Criminal Injustice: A Cost Analysis
of Wrongful Convictions, Errors, and Failed Prosecutions in California’s Criminal Justice System,
CHIEF JUST. EARL WARREN INST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 4 (2015) (finding that over a period of twenty-four
years, California spent $282 million on wrongful convictions, including $120 million for incarceration
alone).
84
NCIP, The Cost of Wrongful Conviction, SANTA CLARA UNIV. SCH. L. (Nov. 8, 2016),
https://law.scu.edu/experiential/northern-california-innocence-project/the-cost-of-wrongful-conviction/;
Kain, supra note 83.
85
See generally supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.
86
See Wrongful Liberty, supra note 79, at 1286 (documenting cases where subsequent crimes were
committed by perpetrators who were free because others were falsely convicted of their previous crimes);
SERI IRAZOLA, ERIN WILLIAMSON, JULIE STRICKER & EMILY NIEDZWIECKI, ICF INT’L, STUDY OF
VICTIM EXPERIENCES OF WRONGFUL CONVICTION iv (2013), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grant
s/244084.pdf (“Victims described the impact of the wrongful conviction as being comparable to, or worse
than, their original victimization.”).
87
See Jeanne Bishop & Mark Osler, Prosecutors and Victims: Why Wrongful Convictions Matter,
105 J. CRIM. & CRIMINOLOGY 1031, 1040–41 (2015) (discussing the role of the victim from crime
through exoneration); see also IRAZOLA ET AL., supra note 86, at 4 ( “If a suspected offender is identified
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of a wrongful conviction, a subsequently litigated exoneration case brings
the wrongfully convicted back into court to get them out of prison.88 In cases
of innocence, the victim frequently struggles with disbelief that the
convicted was not, in fact, the perpetrator.89 The victim may also struggle
with guilt over their testimony and mistaken identification.90 A mistake that
put an innocent person in prison, robbed families from time with their loved
one, and often led to other people being subsequently victimized by the real
perpetrator.91 This guilt is often coupled with a fear that perhaps the
perpetrator is still at large and could victimize them again.92 Furthermore, if
the real perpetrator is apprehended—a much harder prospect after years of
the crime being “solved,” and impossible if a statute of limitations has run—
the victim may have to go through the whole trial process again.93
With all of the above, the problem of wrongful convictions is not just
the harm that they inflict, but that this harm violates the constitutional
safeguards to liberty and property.94 When a person is convicted and
imprisoned, he suffers a loss of liberty, and, with that, his ability to work to
realize the fruits of his labor.95 This ability to work is what fundamentally
allows individuals to create and possess property.96 It is this property right
that is taken when a person is convicted through due process, and it is this

and arrested, and the prosecutor decides to press charges, a victim may be subpoenaed to testify before a
grand jury. Assuming the accused offender is indicted, the victim can choose to attend the arraignment.
The time period between a crime and a trial can often be long and challenging for a victim . . . . However,
it can also be a time of immense stress for crime victims, as they are called on to assist in the investigation
and prosecution, testify in court, and discuss the impact the crime has had on their lives.”).
88
See IRAZOLA ET AL., supra note 86, at 11 (describing the role of the crime victim in the
exoneration process).
89
Id. at iv (“A number of victims described the impact of the wrongful conviction as being
comparable to, or worse than, their original victimization. Following the initial shock, many victims
reported experiencing feelings of guilt and blame.”).
90
Id. at 44 (“I was a mess. I was absolutely hysterical [and] distraught. This was way worse than
being attacked. And I said over and over again, I’d rather [be victimized] again then [sic] go through this.
This was horrible because . . . now I was a perpetrator.”).
91
Id. at 45.
92
Id. at 44 (“It was harder going through the revictimization than it was through the rape . . . . Now
you have the same feelings of that pain. You have the same scariness. You have the same fear. You have
the same panic, but now you have this flood of guilt on top of it.”).
93
Id. at 12 (“In some cases DNA may identify the actual offender; however, without this
identification, a closed case may become a cold case. Victims often want assurance that law enforcement
will pursue the real perpetrator with the same vigor used to investigate the original crime; however, this
is not possible in cases where the statute of limitations has passed.”); see also Time Limits for Charges:
State Criminal Statutes of Limitations, FINDLAW (Apr. 16, 2020), https://criminal.findlaw.com/criminallaw-basics/time-limits-for-charges-state-criminal-statutes-of-limitations.html (listing each state’s
criminal statutes of limitations).
94
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
95
Infra Part III.
96
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 184–202 (Gryphon Eds. 1994) (1689)
(explaining that in labor theory private property is the natural right of one’s own labor, for it is solely
through labor that one can attain property).
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right—when due process affords an exoneration—that requires just
compensation to rectify that taking.97
B. History of the Takings Clause
Property is considered “the most complete right” a person has.98 Being
the owner of property “implies the right to complete control of the good,”
which means the right “to use property, to enjoy the yields of it, to alienate
it, and even to destroy it.”99 It is the protection of this intrinsic right that has
been upheld and preserved throughout history, necessitating safeguards to
be written into law.100
1. Pre-Drafting History and Constitutional Creation
The Takings Clause under the Fifth Amendment has antecedents tracing
back to the Magna Carta in 1215 AD.101 The Magna Carta stated that no man
should be stripped of his rights or possessions except by lawful judgment.102
This document drew a line between private individual rights and royal
powers, including the royal power to take an individual’s property.103
Distinguished English theorists104 expounded upon the ideas put forth in the
97
First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987)
(“[W]here the government’s activities have already worked a taking . . . no subsequent action by the
government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking was
effective.”).
98
Boudewijn Bouckaert, What Is Property?, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 775, 794 (1990).
99
Id. See J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 712–13
(1996), for further reading on what a property right is.
100
Infra Sections I.B.1–2.
101
See Brenda Hale, Magna Carta: Our Shared Heritage, 41 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 135, 135 (2016).
102
English Translation of Magna Carta, BRITISH LIBR. (July 28, 2014) [hereinafter Magna Carta],
https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-english-translation.
103
Jelena Ristik, Right to Property: From Magna Carta to the European Convention on Human
Rights, 11 SEEU REV. 145, 145–46 (2015), https://content.sciendo.com/view/journals/seeur/11/1/articlep145.xml. King John I would seize property by declaring that the property owner was in violation of a
law and subject to the punishment of loss of property; however, he would declare new laws on a whim
and announce his subjects in violation of his made-up laws ex post facto. Id. at 146. The Magna Carta
was written by King John’s barons in an attempt to quash this practice by protecting private owners from
royal, sovereign theft. Id. It is undisputed that all the barons who drafted the Magna Carta—who
represented only the top 20% of the population at the time—were not in agreement on what they wanted
from King John. Mark Cartwright, Magna Carta, ANCIENT HIST. ENCYC. (Nov. 20, 2018),
https://www.ancient.eu/Magna_Carta. This dissension allowed King John, before the royal seal was dry,
to appeal to the Pope who declared the Magna Carta illegal and invalid. Id. It is not the immediate effect
of this practice on society that was the foundation of American law. Id. Rather it was the theory and
concepts laid out in the document that shaped the minds of English thinkers that influenced the Founding
Fathers in how they drafted the founding documents. See Eminent Domain⎯ The Basic Law, L. OFF.
STIMMEL, STIMMEL & ROESER, https://www.stimmel-law.com/en/articles/eminent-domain-basic-law
(last visited Nov. 7, 2019) (citing Founding Fathers quotes on theories of property).
104
See Michael B. Kent, Jr., From “Preferred Position” to “Poor Relation:” History, Wilkie v.
Robbins, and the Status of Property Rights Under the Takings Clause, 39 N.M. L. REV. 89, 95–96, 111
(2009) (discussing John Locke, Sir William Blackstone, and Sir Edward Coke’s contribution to legal
scholarship specific to property interests). Sir Edward Coke (1552–1634) authored Petition of Rights and
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Magna Carta and from the Bible’s teaching on human dignity, putting
forth the understanding that a person’s property first and foremost came
from the ability to work, to create, and to attain that property.107 Hence,
property rights were given through creation, not by governmental rulers.108
In the American colonies, laws were based on English common law and
thus had a strong focus on protecting individual property rights from
government interference.109 During the tumultuous period after the
Revolutionary War, under the weak Articles of Confederation, some new
states passed laws that redistributed and destroyed individual property
rights.110 This destruction was a significant factor in the push to replace the
Articles of Confederation with a government that would and could protect
individual private property rights.111 Accordingly, the Founding Fathers
drafted the Constitution and subsequent Bill of Rights, placing national
sovereignty with the people, but delegating to the government the role of
protecting the rights of the individual.112
105

106

2. American Takings Jurisprudence
The government has the power to take property through eminent
domain,113 which generates one of two types of actions under the Takings
Clause.114 First, and most widely known, are condemnation actions, which
occur when the government files suit in advance to take specific property

Institutes of the Law of England, both expounding on the role of common law in protecting ancient rights
against royal power. Edward J. Sullivan, A Brief History of the Takings Clause, WASH. UNIV. ST. LOUIS
SCH. L., http://landuselaw.wustl.edu/Articles/Brief_Hx_Taking.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2020). John
Locke (1632–1704) wrote in Two Treatises on Government that sovereignty resided not in the state but
in the legislature that ruled for and as appointed by the people. Id. William Blackstone (1723–1780)
wrote Commentaries on the Laws of England, used for the foundation of legal education in both
England and the American colonies, stressing the importance of common law as a protection against
royal powers. Id.
105
See generally Magna Carta, supra note 102.
106
Genesis 1:27 (describing that God created people in His image, and that the people’s role as
God’s image-bearers is the basis on which human dignity lies).
107
See LOCKE, supra note 96, at 185–89.
108
Id. at 188–91.
109
Jonathan Lahn, Note, The Uses of History in the Supreme Court’s Takings Clause Jurisprudence,
81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1233, 1251 (2006).
110
Treanor, supra note 19, at 790. See also Stuart Bruchey, The Impact of Concern for the Security
of Property Rights on the Legal System of the Early American Republic, 1980 WIS. L. REV. 1135, for
further reading on the history and theory of property that formed the basis for the Founders’ ideals.
111
JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 22–23 (1990).
112
See Jeffrey M. Gaba, John Locke and the Meaning of the Takings Clause, 72 MO. L. REV. 525,
526–28 (2007) (analyzing how the Founding Fathers came to limit the government’s authority over
individual rights to a protective role).
113
Eminent Domain⎯The Basic Law, supra note 103.
114
ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RSCH. SERV., TAKINGS DECISIONS OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: A
CHRONOLOGY (2015).
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115

and pays just compensation to the owner. In contrast, a property owner
initiates the second type of lawsuit, claiming that the government, either
directly or by conduct, has taken her property without just compensation.116
This takings action is called “inverse condemnation” because it is effectively
the procedural reverse of a condemnation action.117 While the majority of
takings cases have involved severe regulation of land use, the Takings Clause
encompasses all property, real and personal, tangible and intangible.118
Initially, the Fifth Amendment restricted only the federal government.119
However, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in
1868, allowed the Bill of Rights to be incorporated to the states.120
Incorporation of each right, however, was not automatic.121 It was not until
1897 that the Takings Clause was incorporated to the states under the
Fourteenth Amendment by the Supreme Court.122
A few years after the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, the
legislature passed the Civil Rights Act of 1871, commonly known as Section
1983, which gave private citizens a cause of action to sue a state actor for
constitutional violations.123 Subsequently, in 1887 the Tucker Act was
passed, which allowed an individual to sue the federal government for
takings infractions.124 Citizens now had an equal cause of action to sue for
federal constitutional violations, regardless of whether it was the federal or
state government that had committed the violation.125 Thus, the state or
115
Id. The property owner-defendant in a condemnation action will usually challenge a
condemnation action arguing the taking is not proper under eminent domain because it is not being taken
for the public use. Id.
116
Id.
117
Id. The government brings a condemnation action against a property owner, a property owner
brings an inverse condemnation action against the government. Id. Inverse Condemnation, LEGAL
DICTIONARY (Apr. 4, 2017), https://legaldictionary.net/inverse-condemnation/ (“The taking of land, by
a government entity, without providing just compensation.”).
118
Shelley Ross Saxer, When Local Government Misbehaves, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 105, 109–10;
Meltz, supra note 114.
119
John Raeburn Green, The Supreme Court, the Bill of Rights and the States, 97 U. PA. L. REV.
608, 609 (1949).
120
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 14 (5th ed. 2015).
121
Id.
122
Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897) (incorporating the
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause to the states).
123
Aditya Bamzai & David N. Goldman, The Takings Clause, the Tucker Act, and Knick v.
Township of Scott, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT BLOG (Oct. 9, 2018),
https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/the-takings-clause-the-tucker-act-and-knick-v-township-of-scott-byaditya-bamzai-david-n-goldman/.
124
Tucker Act, ch. 359 § 1, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a), 1491).
125
See Nick Daum, Case Comment, Section 1983, Statutes, and Sovereign Immunity, 112 YALE
L.J. 353, 355 (2002) (explaining how Section 1983 allows for constitutional tort actions against a state).
The most recent Supreme Court decision to analyze whether § 1983 and Tucker Claims were truly equal
found that precedential decisions had given rise to an unequal cause of action between the two. See Knick
v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019). Takings jurisprudence under § 1983 required an exhaustion in
state courts first. Id. at 2167. This exhaustion effectively barred the federal claim under the doctrine of
Full Faith and Credit. Id. Thus, Knick, in 2019, overturned the exhaustion requirement, allowing § 1983
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federal government could take private property from individuals as long as
two constitutional criteria were met: (1) the property must be taken for “public
use,” and (2) the property owner must receive “just compensation.”126
As early as the 1870s, and for the next fifty years, the issue of inverse
condemnation was before the Supreme Court many times, with the Court
evaluating not only when the government physically took land from a private
citizen, but also when government interference would rise to the level of a
taking.127 The majority of interference cases finding a taking arose from
situations where a government dam flooded private land, and the Court
consistently found that the property was taken just as if the government had
formally invoked a condemnation action.128
In the early years of takings jurisprudence, the Court mainly focused on
the question of whether an interference equated to a total physical taking
(invasion and appropriation).129 If a taking was found, then the Court
evaluated whether or not just compensation had been paid.130 This focus
shifted about a quarter of a century later when the Court began to consider
whether government regulation could rise to the level of a taking.131
The landmark case was Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, where a city
passed a law that prohibited mining under homes and residential streets.132
This law was enacted after a coal company, which owned mineral rights to
takings claims to come immediately to the federal courts, just as is allowed in Tucker Claims. Id. at 2172;
see also Miriam Seifter, Opinion Analysis: Court Overrules Takings Precedent, Allowing More Suits in
Federal Court, SCOTUSBLOG (June 22, 2019, 9:32 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/opinio
n-analysis-court-overrules-takings-precedent-allowing-more-suits-in-Federal-court/; see generally Susan
N. Herman, Beyond Parity: Section 1983 and the State Courts, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1057 (1989). A federal
exoneree, who does not qualify under the federal compensation statute, would have to bring the action
under the Tucker Act in the Court of Federal Claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (Tucker Act); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1495 (“Damages for Unjust Conviction and Imprisonment”); 28 U.S.C. § 2513 (“Unjust
Conviction and Imprisonment”). A state exoneree would have the option to bring a 1983 claim in federal
court or sue in state court under the state Constitution. See Ryan Sugden & Marc Simpson, Owners
Can Sue in Federal Court for Inverse Condemnation, COLO . REAL EST. J. (Oct. 25, 2019),
https://crej.com/news/owners-can-sue-in-Federal-court-for-inverse-condemnation/ [hereinafter Owners
Can Sue] (explaining plaintiffs historically were required to bring their claims against the State or its
agencies in state court first until Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162. In Knick v. Twp. of Scott, the
Supreme Court ruled that an owner with a takings claim against a State did not first have to exhaust his
remedies in state court. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2172.
126
Sullivan, supra note 104.
127
Meltz, supra note 114, at 1.
128
For cases in which the Court found a Taking of land because of governmental flooding, see
United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917); United States v. Welch, 217 U.S. 333 (1910); United States
v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903); United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U.S. 645 (1884); Pumpelly v.
Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871).
129
See supra note 128 (listing cases where government interference was ruled a Taking).
130
See id. (citing cases where a Taking had occurred but just compensation had not been paid).
131
Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles—Part I—A
Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1299, 1325 (1989).
132
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412–13 (1922) (“The statute forbids the mining of
anthracite coal in such way as to cause the subsidence of, among other things, any structure used as a
human habitation . . . .”).
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land, had previously sold the surface rights to developers; the law essentially
vitiated the company’s minerals rights because they were no longer able to
mine the coal.133 In this case, the Court used a partial substantive due process
analysis, holding “while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”134
For the next fifty years, the Supreme Court erratically used this analysis,
creating no consistent approach, often leading to wildly varied results.135 The
Court did, however, provide some enduring principals,136 most notably in
Armstrong v. United States, which held that the “Fifth Amendment[] . . .
bar[s] Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”137
It was not until 1978 that the Court established a coherent approach to
deciding takings in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.138
Almost ten years later, this led to the Court’s decision in First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, where it ruled that
if a regulatory taking had occurred but was subsequently repealed, the
property owner must be compensated for the time the regulation was in
effect.139 Moreover, recently, in Horne v. Department of Agriculture, the
Court held that the government has a duty to compensate when it physically
takes property, both real and personal (in this case, a farmer’s raisin crop).140
The Court also held that this duty to compensate may not be avoided by
saving a property owner a contingent interest.141

Id. at 413 (“As applied to this case the statute is admitted to destroy previously existing rights
of property and contract.”).
134
Id. at 415.
135
Meltz, supra note 114; see also Peterson, supra note 131, at 1328–29.
136
See infra notes 137–48148 and accompanying text.
137
364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). The argument of this Note relies heavily on this concept that individuals
should not individually bear the public’s burden specifically when due process has been proven faulty.
See id.
138
438 U.S. 104 (1978). Through this case the Court laid out three factors to be weighed to
determine if a regulatory taking occurred. Id. at 124. Those factors were the “(1) economic impact of
regulation on [the] property owner; (2) extent to which regulation interferes with distinct investmentbacked expectations; and (3) ‘character’ of government action (meaning principally that regulation of
use is less likely to be a taking than physical invasion).” Meltz, supra note 114, at 11.
139
482 U.S. 304, 319 (1987) (“Where this burden results from governmental action that amounted
to a taking, the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that the government pay the
landowner for the value of the use of the land during this period.”).
140
576 U.S. 350, 361 (2015) (“[P]eople still do not expect their property, real or personal, to be
actually occupied or taken away.”).
141
Id. at 352 (“The fact that the growers retain a contingent interest of indeterminate value does not
mean there has been no physical taking, particularly when that interest depends on the discretion of the
taker, and may be worthless, as it was for one of the two years at issue here.”).
133
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Over the last 150 years, the Court has allowed takings claims for
property including land,142 worker’s benefits,143 natural resource rights,144
interest,145 trade secrets,146 liabilities,147 and raisins.148 This clearly shows the
comprehensive protection the Court has afforded holders of all types of
property.149 Specifically, the Takings Clause allows for the distribution of an
individual’s privately held property for public use.150 Still, while the individual
bears the burden, the law requires the individual to be compensated as justly
as possible for that burden.151 That public burden is never as heavily borne by
one person than in the case of wrongful convictions.152
II. CURRENT COMPENSATION FRAMEWORK FOR THE WRONGLY
CONVICTED
“After years—sometimes decades—in prison for crimes they did not
commit, most exonerees never receive meaningful compensation or any
consistent, coordinated post-release assistance. They continue to suffer the
consequences of wrongful conviction for the rest of their lives.”153
“Compensation . . . can never make up for these losses. . . . But if you don’t
have . . . money[,] . . . you can’t afford medical care[,] . . . and you can’t get
a car[,] . . . a job[,] . . . [or an] education . . . . [T]hat’s what happens to so
many . . . people.”154
United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 424 (1980) (finding “property which
had been set aside for the exclusive occupation of the Sioux by the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 . . .
implied an obligation on the part of the Government to make just compensation to the Sioux Nation”).
143
E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998) (finding a taking where a new law required the paying
of medical benefits to a company’s employee coal miners when the company was no longer in business).
144
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (finding a taking when a law stopped a mining
company from mining its coal under inhabited areas).
145
Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998) (holding the interest on an account taken
by the government was a taking because the interest was owned by the client who was the holder of
the principal).
146
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 988 (1984) (explaining the publishing of trade secrets
was a taking where the company had a “reasonable investment-backed expectation” from those secrets).
147
Griggs v. Allegheny Cnty., 369 U.S. 84 (1962) (discussing that the air rights of an airport
operated like an easement to land, and its infringement over a residential area constituted a taking that
required just compensation).
148
Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 351, 361 (2015) (holding that personal property has just as much
protection as real property in an appropriations case). See generally Meltz, supra note 114, for a further
discussion on property the Supreme Court has protected through the Fifth Amendment.
149
See Saxer, supra note 118, at 110 (analyzing the taking jurisprudence for both real and
personal property).
150
Shelley Ross Saxer, Paying for Disasters, 68 KAN. L. REV. 413, 414–15 (2020).
151
Id. at 417.
152
See supra Section I.A (explaining history of wrongful convictions in America and their impact
on the wrongfully accused); see also infra Section III.B. (explaining the public good society receives
from the incarceration of someone they believe was rightly convicted).
153
The Problem, AFTER INNOCENCE, https://www.after-innocence.org/the-problem (last visited
Jan. 8, 2019) (emphasis omitted).
154
See Compensation for Exonerees, supra note 4, at 1 (quoting Barry Scheck, Co-Director,
INNOCENCE PROJECT in Frontline: The Burden of Innocence (PBS television broadcast 2003)).
142
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When an exoneree does get compensation, there are three primary
avenues through which it may be obtained: state statutes, lawsuits, and private
bills.155 Each of these methods comes with unique benefits and pitfalls.156
A. State Statutes
Currently, thirty-seven states, Washington, D.C., and the federal
government have compensation statutes.157 That leaves thirteen states with
no legislative avenue for compensation.158 Generally speaking, state
compensation statutes allow an individual to pursue a claim for
compensation against the state.159 State statutes are regarded as the most
equitable compensation mechanism in comparison to lawsuits and private
bills.160 The point of statutes is to streamline the process for compensation,161
and statutes are usually hailed by politicians and society as a win for
justice.162 However, each state designs its own compensation statute, with its
own parameters that exonerees must meet to qualify for compensation.163
These parameters are written to disqualify exonerees from compensation and

155

Id.
See infra Part II (explaining the current framework of compensation claims).
157
Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.or
g/compensating-wrongly-convicted (last visited Dec. 8, 2021). Of the thirteen states without legislative
compensation statutes, two states have recently tried to pass legislation: Delaware, 2021 Bill Tracking
DE H.B. 118 (LEXIS), and Oregon, 2021 Bill Tracking OR S.B. 499. See Compensating the Wrongly
Convicted, supra. Of the remaining eleven states, six have had bills in their legislatures that have failed:
Alaska, 2017 Bill Tracking AK H.B. 118 (LEXIS); Arizona, 2019 Bill Tracking AZ S.B. 1359 (LEXIS);
Georgia, 2019 Bill Tracking GA H.B. 172 (LEXIS); New Mexico, 1997 Bill Tracking NM H.B. 267
(LEXIS); Pennsylvania, 2013 Bill Tracking PA H.B. 1885; and South Carolina, 2019 Bill Text SC H.B.
3303 (LEXIS). See Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, supra. This leaves the last five states—
Arkansas, Kentucky, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming—showing no legislative movement on
the topic. Id.
158
See Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, supra note 157.
159
Lauren C. Boucher, Comment, Advancing the Argument in Favor of State Compensation for the
Erroneously Convicted and Wrongfully Incarcerated, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1069, 1084 (2007).
160
Compensation for Exonerees, supra note 4, at 3.
161
See, e.g., Assemb. Bill 316, 2009 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009) (enacted) (explaining that the intent of
the statute is to “remedy some of the harm caused to all factually innocent people . . . and . . . ease their
transition back into society”).
162
See Jameson Cook, Wrongful Conviction Compensation Bill Passes State Legislature, VOICE
(Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.voicenews.com/news/wrongful-conviction-compensation-bill-passesstate-legislature/article_7218138e-f52a-5e14-bb8b-54e98d0d7127.html (reporting on the passage of a
compensation bill in Michigan); Brad Cooper, UPDATED: Legislature Passes Bill Compensating
Wrongfully Convicted, SUNFLOWER STATE J. (May 3, 2018), https://sunflowerstatejournal.com/senateagrees-to-compensation-for-wrongfully-convicted (updating on the passage of a Kansas compensation
bill); Betsy Z. Russell, Wrongful Conviction Compensation Bill Passes House Unanimously, IDAHO
PRESS (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.idahopress.com/eyeonboise/wrongful-conviction-compensationbill-passes-house-unanimously/article_8137126d-8c2e-53d8-a7c4-7476a7effbc8.html (celebrating the
passage of an Idaho compensation bill).
163
Robert J. Norris, Assessing Compensation Statutes for the Wrongly Convicted, 23 CRIM. JUST.
POL’Y REV. 352, 358–59 (2012).
156
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typically fall into a few categories: (1) disqualifying behavior;164 (2)
exoneration rulings;165 (3) standards of proof;166 (4) statute of limitations,

164

Statutes with these provisions disqualify exonerees for a variety of behaviors including having
a prior felony conviction, engaging in behavior that contributed to the wrongful conviction, or entering
a guilty plea. Miller, supra note 6; Norris, supra note 163 at 359. This disqualifier, a felony conviction,
was the reason Clifford Williams, the exoneree from Florida in the introduction, was not able to collect
compensation. Miller, supra note 6. See also Facts and Figures, F ALSECONFESSIONS.ORG,
https://falseconfessions.org/fact-sheet (last visited Jan. 20, 2020) (“According to the Innocence Project,
25% of wrongful convictions overturned by DNA evidence involve a false confession . . . .”). A
contributing factor can be a misconstrued finding of fact. Justin Brooks & Alexander Simpson, Find the
Cost of Freedom: The State of Wrongful Conviction Compensation Statutes Across the Country and the
Strange Legal Odyssey of Timothy Atkins, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 627, 649–50 (2012). In the case of
Timothy Atkins, the administrative commission reviewing his claim for compensation found he
contributed to the conviction because he ran when the police first approached him. Id. at 644, 650. The
compensation commission found this even though Atkins’s testimony was ruled credible and was not a
factor considered by the original trial court influencing his conviction. Id. at 644. See Innocents Who
Plead Guilty, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS (Nov. 24, 2015), www.law.umich.edu/special/exonerat
ion/Documents/NRE.Guilty.Plea.Article1.pdf (explaining 15% of known exonerees pled guilty). In
1996, Rodney Roberts, who was working a good job and living with his infant son, was arrested for an
altercation with a friend. Why Rodney Roberts Pleaded Guilty to a Crime He Did Not Commit,
INNOCENCE PROJECT (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.innocenceproject.org/why-rodney-roberts-pleadedguilty. The prosecutors offered to accept a guilty plea in exchange for a seven-year sentence. Id. His court
appointed attorney advised him to take the deal or he would risk receiving a life sentence. Id.
165
A second parameter in some statutes is the exoneration ruling required to qualify for
compensation. See Brooks & Simpson, supra note 164, at 639–40; see also Jeffrey S. Gutman, An
Empirical Reexamination of State Statutory Compensation for the Wrongly Convicted, 82 MO. L. REV.
369, 371 nn.7–8 (2017) [hereinafter Reexamination] (listing Colorado, D.C., Iowa, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New Jersey, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin as places requiring an actual
innocence ruling and Maine, Maryland, North Carolina, and Tennessee as states requiring a pardon from
the governor). For a deeper comparison of compensation laws, see Norris, supra note 163.
166
A third parameter in some statutes is the requirement of a separate ruling on the facts of a case,
after and separate from the exoneration proceeding, to decide if an exoneree qualifies for compensation.
Brooks & Simpson, supra note 164, at 641–42. The separate ruling will typically require a specific burden
of proof, either innocent by a preponderance of evidence or clear and convincing evidence. Id. “Clear
and convincing evidence” means that the evidence is highly and substantially more likely to be true than
untrue, or highly probable. Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984). “Preponderance of the
evidence” means there is a greater than 50% chance the claim is true. Preponderance of the Evidence,
LEGAL INFO. I NST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/preponderance_of_the_evidence (last visited
Feb. 5, 2020); see also Clear and Convincing Evidence, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.e
du/wex/clear_and_convincing_evidence (last visited Feb. 5, 2020) (explaining a “clear and convincing”
standard is more rigorous than a “preponderance” standard, but less rigorous then a “beyond a reasonable
doubt” standard). This evidentiary showing will be required in whatever forum the state sets up by statute
to hear compensation claims, separate from the exoneration ruling, under a separate ruling body. See
Brooks & Simpson, supra note 164, at 644 (discussing exoneree Tim Atkins’s compensation claim before
the California Victims Compensation Board).
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access, and timing issues;
and (5) waiver of other claims. These
parameters are problematic because if a statute does not actually allow
exonerees to get compensated, the statute is not a win for anyone.169 Even
though state statutes seek to give streamlined and uniformed processes for
compensating the wrongfully convicted, in actual effect, these disqualifiers
provide convoluted and irregular results, leaving many exonerees without
any compensation or recourse.170
B. Civil Lawsuits
Another avenue that may be available to compensate an exoneree is a
civil lawsuit for misconduct against government officials.171 This avenue is
only available to exonerees who can prove official wrongdoing.172 If the
conviction was based on misidentification, outdated science, perjury by a
layperson, or a false confession—without more—then it is not official
misconduct, and the exoneree will have no legal remedy.173 Further
complicating this remedy, government officials are frequently shielded from
civil liability by immunity doctrines that create a very high bar to succeed in

167

A fourth parameter in some statutes can involve a statute of limitations, access to the
compensation system, and other timing issues. See Daniel S. Kahn, Presumed Guilty until Proven
Innocent: The Burden of Proof in Wrongful Conviction Claims Under State Compensation Statutes, 44
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 123, 144–45 (2010) (explaining these parameters). A statute of limitations
balances the competing interests of giving the exoneree enough time to file a claim and giving the state
protection from an onslaught of delayed claims that undermine its ability to plan for budgetary liabilities.
Id. at 144.
168
The fifth and last parameter in some statutes is the requirement that an exoneree waive all other
claims and remedies. Compensation for Exonerees, supra note 4, at 3. Waiver is reasonable in states that
have a robust compensation award system. Id. By contrast, when an exoneree has a case of egregious
misconduct and is in a state with a more modest statutory scheme, the exoneree must choose between a
tort claim that could yield millions or possibly nothing, and a far inferior but more certain award under
the state’s statutory compensation. Id. (“Lawsuits can result in larger payouts than state statutes, but they
require exonerees to take risks. The exoneree may win big or lose altogether. Lawyers may be unwilling
to take such lawsuits if the prospects for a favorable outcome are not great.”).
169
See Brooks & Simpson, supra note 164, at 635 (explaining that statutes are frequently flawed
and misinterpreted).
170
See id. (analyzing the flaws in state compensation statutes).
171
See generally Michael Avery, Obstacles to Litigating Civil Claims for Wrongful Conviction: An
Overview, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 439 (2009) (dissecting the legal hurdles to litigating civil claims from
a wrongful conviction).
172
Id.
173
See generally id.
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174

a tort claim. Additionally, this method is costly, time consuming, and
requires a civil attorney.175
C. Private Bills
The final and most complicated avenue for compensation is a private
bill—state legislation providing individual relief.176 This type of legislation
requires political clout, extraordinary advocacy, and a protracted timeframe
of legislative procedures—all with no guaranteed or consistent results.177
This method has never been an efficient, predictable, or sustainable avenue
for compensation.178 It is particularly limited in its effectiveness due to the
recent upswing in the number of exonerations occurring each year.179
III. ANALYZING A TAKINGS REMEDY FOR WRONGFUL CONVICTION
COMPENSATION
A wrongful conviction is an infringement on an individual’s liberty and
property rights that the safeguards of due process did not protect against.180
However, a wrongful conviction is also an illustration of how due process,
borne out a second time in the post-conviction appeals process, can remedy
that deprivation of the exoneree’s liberty rights.181 Following logically,
where due process restores the exoneree’s liberty, just compensation is the
constitutionally required remedy for the taking of the exoneree’s property—
in this case, the exoneree’s labor.182

Id. at 440 n.5 (“A principal source of difficulty with respect to these claims, as with all § 1983
claims, is the judge-made doctrine of qualified immunity . . . . In general, . . . a wrongfully convicted
person will be denied a civil rights remedy unless he can prove not only that his constitutional rights were
violated, but that a reasonable officer would have known that his specific conduct violated clearly
established constitutional rights. In the hands of conservative jurists this doctrine is a considerable hurdle
for plaintiffs to overcome.”).
175
Adele Bernhard, A Short Overview of the Statutory Remedies for the Wrongly Convicted: What
Works, What Doesn’t and Why, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 403, 403 (2009).
176
See Compensation for Exonerees, supra note 4, at 3 (“Private bills are inequitable and inefficient.
Politically connected, well represented, or especially sympathetic exonerees may get compensated, while
others are not.”).
177
See Bernhard, supra note 175, at 407–09.
178
Id.
179
See Interactive Data Display on Exonerations by State and Total by Year, NAT’L REGISTRY
EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exonerations-in-the-United-Stat
es-Map.aspx (last visited Jan. 24, 2020) (showing exonerations by state and other information, updated
daily).
180
Supra Section I.A.2.ii.
181
See generally Merges, supra note 22.
182
Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2172 (2019) (“Compensation under the Takings Clause
is a remedy for the ‘constitutional violation’ that ‘the []owner has already suffered’ at the time of the
uncompensated taking.” (quoting San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 654 (1982)
(Brennan, J., dissenting))).
174
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A. Fifth Amendment Construction
The Fifth Amendment primarily provides constitutional protections for
individual rights against the police power.183 The government is limited by
the Fifth Amendment, primarily in the context of prosecutions, but it also
limits the government’s power to take property from its citizens. 184
There is a significant difference between the liberty rights stated at the
beginning of the Fifth Amendment and the concluding clause that gives
protection to private property.185 It feels out of place, but this last clause is
the only clause in the Fifth Amendment with a separate remedy.186 The first
listed rights seek to protect an individual’s liberty and offer due process as a
way to remedy violations of these rights.187 While these pieces of the
Amendment point toward due process—what must be done and how to
ensure the process is fair—the last piece gives a substantive remedy: just
compensation.188 Therefore, when the interests of the public infringe on an
individual’s property rights, this Amendment dictates that just compensation
is required.189
B. Wrongful Convictions Are Akin to an Inverse Condemnation Taking
In the instance of a conviction, due process allows the government to
incarcerate a person for the public good.190 This incarceration includes the
complete appropriation and regulation of an inmate’s labor.191 Thus, when
183

Fifth Amendment: An Overview, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fifth_a
mendment (last visited Nov. 6, 2019).
184
The Fifth Amendment, VOICE OF AM. (Jan. 19, 2018), https://editorials.voa.gov/a/the-fifthamendment/4216357.html.
185
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”).
186
Id. (“without just compensation”).
187
See generally The Fifth Amendment: An Overview, supra note 184 (breaking down the rights
enumerated in the Fifth Amendment and the remedies provided by the plain text).
188
Id. (explaining compensation is a substantive remedy). A common argument is calling
everything in the Fifth Amendment “substantive due process.” Due Process, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/due_process (last visited Feb. 25, 2020). I reject this theory and
propose that the clauses were not intended to be combined, hence the semicolon. But see generally
Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law
Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585, 589–90 (2009) (discussing the debate
among scholars if the Fifth Amendment protects only substantive rights, only procedural rights, or both).
189
Gedicks, supra note 188, at 665–66.
190
See generally Joshua A. Jones, Wrongful Conviction in the American Judicial Process: History,
Scope, and Analysis, 4 INQUIRIES J. (2012), www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/682/wrongful-convictionin-the-american-judicial-process-history-scope-and-analysis (explaining the judicial process in the
United States).
191
See infra Section III.B.1–2 (discussing how the appropriation and regulation of an exoneree’s
labor is a taking).
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the conviction is later overturned by the due process of a post-conviction
proceeding, the second due process nullifies the first, making the original
conviction and incarceration no longer justified.192
The Court was clear in Nelson v. Colorado that the second due process
resulting in exoneration erases the conviction.193 Accordingly, the Fifth
Amendment demands just compensation for the property interest that was
taken: the exoneree’s labor.194
Historically, courts have answered a few questions when deciding
takings claims. Was there a taking of property?195 How did the taking
occur?196 When did the taking occur?197 Was the taking from government
action and for the public good?198 These are the same questions that need to
be answered to recognize a wrongful conviction as a taking.199
1. Was There a Taking of Property?
“‘Property’ is a word of very broad meaning, and when used without
qualification, expressly made or plainly implied, it reasonably may be
construed to include obligations, rights, and other intangibles as well as
physical things.”200 To that end, the Supreme Court has explained that the
Constitution does not create property interests⎯it merely protects them.201
Property interests are thus determined “by existing rules of understandings
that stem from an independent source such as state law.”202 Put plainly, the
Supreme Court has articulated that the entitlement of a property right is
grounded in state law, and such a right, once given, is then protected by the
Constitution.203 In light of this, it is state law, affirmed and galvanized by
192
See Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 1255, 1258 (2017) (holding that when a conviction is
invalidated with no prospect of re-prosecution, due process requires that the presumption of innocence
attaches ab initio).
193
Id.
194
See generally Martin S. Goldberg, Recent Developments: First English Evangelical Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles: Tile Evolution of the Just Compensation Clause⎯Court Requires
Monetary Compensation for Temporary Regulatory Taking of Property, 18 U. BALT. L.F. 33 (1987)
(discussing the evolution of takings jurisprudence); see also First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (holding if a regulation takes property, where the
government believes it can rightly take it, the Takings Clause requires compensation to be paid from the
time the taking occurred until the date it was returned).
195
See infra Section III.B.1 (explaining what property was taken).
196
See infra Section III.B.2 (arguing a wrongful conviction could be a regulatory or physical
appropriation taking); see also, e.g., Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 350, 359–61 (2015) (holding that
personal property has just as much protection as real property in an appropriation case); Pa. Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (ruling a taking when a law stopped a mining company from mining
its coal under inhabited areas).
197
See infra Section III.B.3 (describing when a taking occurred).
198
See infra Section III.B.4 (discussing why there was government action for the public good).
199
See infra Section III.B.
200
Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Arenz, 290 U.S. 66, 68–69 (1933).
201
Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998).
202
Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
203
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982).
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the Supreme Court, that will lay the foundation for the argument that an
exoneree has a compensable property right in her labor that was taken by her
wrongful conviction.204
Many arguments have historically been made on what should be
considered property that was taken from an exoneree.205 This Note argues
that a compensable property right taken from an exoneree by a wrongful
conviction is the taking of an exoneree’s labor during incarceration.206 Labor
has been held to be a property right in twenty-three states207 and upheld by
204
See id. (“The hallmark of property, the Court has emphasized, is an individual entitlement
grounded in state law, which cannot be removed except ‘for cause.’ [citations omitted]”).
205
See Edwin M. Borchard, European Systems of State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal Justice, 3
J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 684, 697 (1912) (arguing that a loss borne by an individual should
be borne by the whole, but not making a direct property argument); Erik Encarnacion, Backpay for
Exonerees, 29 YALE J.L. & HUMANS. 245, 246–48 (2017) (comparing incarceration to holding a job and
suggesting that compensation could be paid as a wage for time served); Why and How, supra note 28, at
145 (arguing that a wrongful conviction is a strict liability wrong and thus exonerees should be entitled
to compensation, further setting up what adequate compensation might look like); John Martinez,
Wrongful Convictions as Rightful Takings: Protecting “Liberty-Property”, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 515, 516
(2008) (arguing that a wrongful conviction is a taking of liberty, which should be looked at just as if it
were a taking of property); Howard S. Master, Note, Revisiting the Takings-Based Argument for
Compensating the Wrongfully Convicted, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 97, 97–98 (2004) (making a
takings-based argument for compensation of an exoneree’s labor based on states that have already ruled
that labor is property). Master wrote his Note in 2004, when most states did not have compensation
statutes. Id. at 104. His Note argues that a takings argument is a stop gap until legislative schemes catch
up to the demand of the injustice. Id. at 148.
206
See infra note 212 and accompanying text (discussing the Founders’ understanding of labor, not
only as property but as the source of all property, derived from the work of John Locke). See also Holden
v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391 (1898) (“As the possession of property, of which a person cannot be deprived,
doubtless implies that such property may be acquired, it is safe to say that a state law which undertakes to
deprive any class of persons of the general power to acquire property would also be obnoxious to the same
provision. Indeed, we may go a step further, and say that, as property can only be legally acquired as between
living persons by contract, a general prohibition against entering into contracts with respect to property, or
having as their object the acquisition of property, would be equally invalid.”).
207
See Eliasberg Bros. Mercantile Co. v. Grimes, 86 So. 56, 58 (Ala. 1920) (“Money or any other
thing of value, acquired as gain or profit from capital or labor, is property; in the aggregate these
acquisitions constitute income; and, in accordance with the axiom that the whole includes all of its parts,
income includes property and nothing but property, and therefore is itself property.”); De Lisio v. Alaska
Superior Ct., 740 P.2d 437, 442 (Alaska 1987) (holding the appropriation of an attorney’s labor is a
taking); New Method Laundry Co. v. MacCann, 161 P. 990, 991–92 (Cal. 1916) (“This right of a citizen
to pursue any calling, business, or profession he may choose is a property right to be guarded by equity
as zealously as any other form of property. Labor is property. The laborer has the same right to sell his
labor, and to contract with reference thereto, as any other property owner.”) (citations omitted); Bd. of
Comm’rs v. Rocky Mountain News Printing Co., 61 P. 494, 496 (Colo. App. 1900) (“Everything which
has an exchangeable value is property. The right of property includes the power to dispose of it according
to the will of the owner. Labor is property.”) (citations omitted); State v. Wordin, 14 A. 801, 802 (Conn.
1887) (noting that a doctor’s services are a property that may be utilized by the community); Fortune v.
Braswell, 77 S.E. 818, 819 (Ga. 1913) (“Indeed, it will not be seriously controverted that the right to
labor and the right to contract with others to labor upon one’s property are to be regarded as property
within the meaning of the constitutional guaranty.”); W. & Atl. R.R. Co. v. Bishop, 50 Ga. 465, 470
(1873) (“Labor is property, and the laborer has, and ought to have, the same right to contract in reference
to it as other freemen have in reference to their property.”); Olson v. Idora Hill Mining Co., 155 P. 291,
293 (Idaho 1916) (“[L]abor is property for which due compensation is to be paid.”); Mathews v. People,
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67 N.E. 28, 32 (Ill. 1903) (“[T]he privilege of contracting . . . is a property right. . . . Labor is property.”)
Ritchie v. People, 40 N.E. 454, 455 (Ill. 1895) (“The right to use, buy, and sell property and contract in
respect thereto is protected by the constitution. Labor is property, and the laborer has the same right to
sell his labor, and to contract with reference thereto, as has any other property owner.”); Republic Iron
& Steel Co. v. State, 66 N.E. 1005, 1007 (Ind. 1903) (“Labor is property. It is exchangeable for food and
raiment and comforts, and may be bought and sold, and contracts made in relation thereto, the same as
concerning any other property.”); Coffeyville Vitrified Brick & Tile Co. v. Perry, 76 P. 848, 850 (Kan.
1904) (“Labor is property. The laborer had the same right to sell his labor and to contract with reference
thereto as any other property-owner.”); Dasch v. Jackson, 183 A. 534, 538 (Md. 1936) (“It is a recognized
principle of American constitutional law that every man has the right to labor, to contract, to
hold property, and in his own way to pursue happiness.”); Raymer v. Trefry, 132 N.E. 190, 192 (Mass.
1921) (“Property is a word of large import. It has been interpreted as including the right to make contracts
for labor and for personal service.”); Bogni v. Perotti, 112 N.E. 853, 855 (Mass. 1916) (“It was settled
that the right to labor and to make contracts to work is a property right . . . . Controversy on that subject
before this court must be regarded as put at rest . . . . The right to work, therefore, is property. One cannot
be deprived of it by simple mandate of the Legislature. It is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States and by numerous guarantees of our Constitution. It is as much
property as the more obvious forms of goods and merchandise, stocks and bonds. That it may be also a
part of the liberty of the citizen does not affect its character as property.”); S. Bus Lines, Inc. v.
Amalgamated Ass’n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Emps. of Am., 38 So. 2d 765, 771 (Miss. 1949)
(“Labor is property. To deprive the laborer and the employer of this right to contract peaceably with one
another is to violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States . . .
.”); State ex rel. Evans v. Gordon, 149 S.W. 638 (Mo. 1912); Branson v. Indus. Workers of the World,
95 P. 354, 361 (Nev. 1908) (“The right to labor is property. It is one of the most valuable and fundamental
of rights. The right to work is the right to earn one’s subsistence, to live and to support wife and family.
The right of master and servant to enter into contracts, to agree upon the terms and conditions under
which the one will employ and the other will labor, is property.”); Bayonne Textile Corp. v. Am. Fed’n
of Silk Workers, 168 A. 799, 804 (N.J. Ch. 1933) (“Labor is property; capital is property; both must be
safeguarded.”); W. Walley, Inc. v. Saks & Co., 41 N.Y.S.2d 739, 744 (N.Y. App. Div. 1943) (“The rule
that a court of equity concerns itself only in the protection of property rights treats any civil right of a
pecuniary nature as a property right; and the right to acquire property by honest labor or the conduct of
a lawful business is as much entitled to protection as the right to guard property already acquired. It is
this right that furnishes the basis of the jurisdiction in the ordinary case of unfair competition.”) (citations
omitted); Kealey v. Faulkner, 7 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 49, 60 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1907) (holding labor and the right
to contract is property); Nation v. Chism, 6 P.2d 766, 770 (Okla. 1931) (“[T]he right to labor or to seek
employment, or to continue the relation of employer and employee, is also a property right.”);
Commonwealth v. Brown, 8 Pa. Super. 339, 343 (1898) (“Labor is property, and every laboring man has
the indefeasible right to enter into any contract for the sale of his labor that in his opinion will be the
most advantageous and remunerative to himself, provided he does not infringe upon the rights of others
in so doing.”); Ex parte Hollman, 60 S.E. 19, 30 (S.C. 1908) (“It is equally true that labor is property,
and the right to contract for labor is a property right.”); State v. Smith, 273 S.W.2d 143, 147 (Tenn. 1954)
(“[T]his Court has held that labor is property.”); Jordon v. State, 103 S.W. 633, 634 (Tex. Crim. App.
1907) (“As we understand the question, labor is property, and the laborer has the same right to sell his
labor and make contracts with reference thereto as he would any other property he had.”); State v.
Cadigan, 50 A. 1079, 1081 (Vt. 1901) (“To deprive one of the right to labor and transact business is to
deprive him of his liberty, and also of his property.”); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists Dist. 10 v. Wisconsin,
No. 2015CV000628, 2016 Wisc. Cir. LEXIS 1, at *10 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 2016) (“Plaintiffs plainly theorize
that services constitute property under the law and the Court agrees. The conclusion is logical. Labor is
a commodity that can be bought and sold. A doctor, a telephone company, a mechanic—all would be
shocked to find they do not own the services they perform.”).
In some states, the idea that labor is property has been discussed in dissenting opinions. McNamara
v. State, 181 N.E. 512, 516 (Ind. 1932) (“Employment or labor and the right to labor constitute property
. . . and whatever deprives one of his right to labor deprives him of his property.”) (Martin, J., dissenting);
Benschoter v. Hakes, 8 N.W.2d 481, 493–94 (Iowa 1943) (“It is an inalienable and inherent right of every
man and woman . . . to deal with and make contracts affecting their property and right to labor as they
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208

the U.S. Supreme Court multiple times. Therefore, as the Massachusetts
Supreme Court held in 1916, “[i]t [is] settled that the right to labor . . . is a
property right,” and one hundred years later, that right is still well-settled.209
2. How Did the Taking Occur?
A wrongful conviction can be argued either as a physical appropriation
taking or a regulatory taking.210 A regulatory taking, in effect, says that while
one’s property is not physically taken, the government’s regulation of it, for
the public benefit, deprives the property owner of all economic use of the
property.211 Hence, in an exoneration context, imprisonment strips an inmate
of all economic benefit of his labor, depriving him of the only exertion—
work—that can bring about property.212
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, the regulatory takings case about
the coal company, expounded on above, held that “the right to coal consists
in the right to mine it.”213 “To make [mining coal] commercially
impracticable . . . has very nearly the same effect . . . as appropriating or
destroying it.”214 The ordinance in Mahon did not take the company’s
physical property, but impeded the ability of the company to use its labor to
extract value from its property.215 Likewise, a person who is wrongly
see fit. Such rights are recognized and safeguarded by provisions of both the state and United States
Constitutions.”) (Bliss, J., dissenting); O’Connell v. State Bd. of Equalization, 25 P.2d 114, 123 (Mont.
1933) (noting that labor is a piece of the whole that makes up property) (Callaway, C.J., dissenting); Int’l
Union of Operating Eng’rs v. Sand Point Country Club, 519 P.2d 985, 991 (Wash. 1974) (“With the right
to labor and to contract for labor regarded as a property right under the American common law.”) (Hale,
C.J., dissenting).
208
See Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565, 1573 (2020) (holding the theft of labor can undergird
a theft of property case); Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333 (1916) (“[F]or some purposes labor must be
considered as property.”); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 172 (1908) (“[L]iberty and [property]
right embraces the right to make contracts for the purchase of the labor of others and equally the right to
make contracts for the sale of one’s own labor . . .”); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 684 (1888)
(“[P]ursuing an ordinary calling or trade, and of acquiring, holding, and selling property, is an essential
part of . . . rights of liberty and property, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The court assents
to this general proposition as embodying a sound principle of constitutional law.”).
209
Bogni v. Perotti, 112 N.E. 853, 855 (Mass. 1916) (citing Adair, 208 U.S. at 173–75; Coppage v.
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 10 (1915)).
210
See Tom R. Shapiro & Tava M. Ostrenger, Preparing for and Litigating Unexpected Inverse
Condemnation Claims, LEAGUE CAL. CITIES pt. II (May 4, 2016), https://www.cacities.org/ResourcesDocuments/Member-Engagement/Professional-Departments/City-Attorneys/Library/2016/Spring2016/5-2016-Spring-Preparing-for-and-Litigating-Unexpec (“The [government], in most cases, has not
engaged in the activity with the intent to take the property, but merely to assert some form of control over
its use through the implementation of a regulation or an exercise of its police power to protect public
health, safety, and welfare.”).
211
See id. at Section II.B (explaining what a regulatory taking is).
212
LOCKE, supra note 96, at 184–202 (explaining ownership of private property is based on the
natural right of one’s ownership of one’s own labor, and the right to nature’s common property to the
extent that one’s labor can utilize it).
213
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922) (quoting Commonwealth v. Clearview Coal
Co., 256 Pa. 328, 331 (1917)).
214
Id.
215
Id. at 412–14.
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imprisoned has his ability to use his labor—the only means of earning
property—taken by his incarceration.216 The taking in Mahon is analogous
to the taking of an exoneree’s work because the work of mining being
hindered meant no right to labor, and thus no realization of the property—
coal.217 Likewise, the taking of an exoneree’s ability to work means no
realization of the fruits of his labor.218
A wrongful conviction is also analogous to a taking of an exoneree’s
work by physical appropriation.219 This is because while imprisoned, the
government actually physically appropriates the exoneree’s labor and has
the constitutional authority to do so by the Thirteenth Amendment.220 The
Thirteenth Amendment allows the appropriation of an inmate’s labor as
punishment for a valid conviction.221 However, once the conviction is
invalidated, that appropriation, once allowed as a punishment, must now be
compensated for as a taking.222
This taking by physical appropriation argument is supported by Horne
v. Department of Agriculture, mentioned previously, where raisin growers
had a portion of their crops physically set aside for government use.223
Tellingly, in deciding Horne, the Supreme Court was divided on whether the
case should be ruled a regulatory takings case or a physical appropriation
takings case.224 The majority of the Court held Horne as an appropriation
case because a portion of the raisins were physically required to be set
aside.225 The Court held that it was “the government’s ‘categorical duty’
under the Fifth Amendment to pay just compensation when it ‘physically
takes possession of an interest in property,’” including personal property.226
So when the government has complete control over a prisoner, including
complete control over his labor—a personal property interest—then that
216

See Rights of Inmates, FINDLAW (July 20, 2017), https://civilrights.findlaw.com/otherconstitutional-rights/rights-of-inmates.html (listing the limited rights an incarcerated person has).
217
Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412–14.
218
See id. at 414 (“To make it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the
same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it.”).
219
See infra pp. 29–31.
220
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
221
Id.
222
Accord Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 1255 (2017) (holding when a conviction is
invalidated with no prospect of re-prosecution, due process requires that the presumption of innocence
attaches ab initio).
223
Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 351, 354 (2015).
224
Id. at 354–70. But see id. at 377–88 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing against the majority’s
view that the Taking was by physical appropriation and that it should be held as regulatory, and thus the
retained interest was reasonable and would cut off a claim for just compensation).
225
Id. The dissenting opinion clearly argued against the majority’s holding specifically by viewing
the case as a regulatory taking (where the majority saw it as a physical taking) and therefore explained
that as a regulatory taking, without total deprivation, there can be no taking. Id. at 377–88 (explaining
the retention of an interest vitiates a claim for a per se taking).
226
Id. at 357 (majority opinion) (quoting Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct.
511, 518 (2012)).
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interest has been completely physically appropriated by the government.227
Complicating the analysis in Horne was that the raisin growers were not
paid for the portion of raisins taken, but the Hornes reserved an interest in
any net profit if the government utilized the appropriation. 228 The Court held
that allowing the owner to retain an interest in the appropriated raisins was
by no means equivalent to paying just compensation. 229 This is helpful to the
exoneration analysis because many exonerees earn a wage from prison jobs,
and these wages are analogous to the Hornes’s retained interest.230 All of the
circuit courts agree that prisoners are generally not considered employees in
their prisons, and thus are not entitled to compensation or protection under
the Fair Labor Standards Act.231 Indeed, multiple circuits have held that
inmates have no constitutional right to compensation for their labor as
inmates, and any such wage is “by grace of the state.”232 Just as the Court
found in Horne that the retained interest did not preclude a physical
appropriation takings claim for just compensation, the retained wages of an
exoneree’s prison labor also should not vitiate a claim for just compensation
from the taking of the exoneree’s labor once the underlying conviction has
been invalidated.233
Further, when an inmate is imprisoned, he is physically under the control of
the governmental corrections agency.234 It is the correctional agency that
chooses to contract out the inmate’s labor, to use the labor within the prison, or

227

See infra notes 230–31 and accompanying text.
Horne, 576 U.S. at 352 (explaining that, in the two years prior to the case filing, the Hornes did
not receive any money from this retained interest).
229
Id. at 363. But see id. at 385–86 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (explaining that the retention of an
interest vitiates a claim for a per se taking).
230
See PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, Prison Labor: Prison Labor in the Federal Prisons; Prison Labor
in the States, in THE PRISON INDEX: TAKING THE PULSE OF THE CRIME CONTROL INDUSTRY,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/prisonindex/prisonlabor.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2020) (citing U.S. GEN.
ACCT. OFF., GAO/GGD-93-98, PRISONER LABOR: PERSPECTIVES ON PAYING THE FEDERAL MINIMUM
WAGE 19 (1993)). These jobs pay on average less than $2 per hour. See Wendy Sawyer, How Much Do
Incarcerated People Earn in Each State?, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Apr. 28, 2017),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/04/10/wages/ (reporting the average low wage as $0.14 per
hour, and the average high wage as $1.41 per hour).
231
Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 243–44 (3d Cir. 1999); Gambetta v. Prison Rehab.
Indus. & Diversified Enters., Inc., 112 F.3d 1119, 1124–25 (11th Cir. 1997); Danneskjold v. Hausrath,
82 F.3d 37, 43–44 (2d Cir. 1996); Reimonenq v. Foti, 72 F.3d 472, 475 n.3 (5th Cir. 1996); McMaster v.
Minnesota, 30 F.3d 976, 980 (8th Cir. 1994); Henthorn v. Dep’t of Navy, 29 F.3d 682, 684–87 (D.C. Cir.
1994); Harker v. State Use Indus., 990 F.2d 131, 133 (4th Cir. 1993); Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387,
1392–98 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc); Franks v. Okla. State Indus., 7 F.3d 971, 972 (10th Cir. 1993); Miller
v. Dukakis, 961 F.2d 7, 8–9 (1st Cir. 1992); Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 1992).
232
Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 809 (quoting Sigler v. Lowrie, 404 F.2d 659, 661 (8th Cir. 1968)); cf.
Draper v. Rhay, 315 F.2d 193, 197–98 (9th Cir. 1963).
233
Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 1255 (2017) (holding when a conviction is invalidated with
no prospect of re-prosecution, due process requires that the presumption of innocence attaches ab initio).
234
Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 809.
228
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235

to do nothing with it. The inmate has no ability to choose his own calling,236
contract for his own labor,237 choose to forego working, or even bargain for a
better employer.238 The inmate’s labor—his property—during the time of
imprisonment is completely taken by the government for its own use.239
In deciding between a regulatory and physical appropriation taking for
a wrongful conviction claim, the best argument comes down to whether a
prisoner was allowed to work and whether he was paid for his prison labor
or not.240 The physical appropriation classification argument should prevail
when an exoneree worked and received wages from his prison job.241 By
contrast, an exoneree who was not paid for labor or was not given a prison
job has an equally strong argument for a regulatory taking.242 These
classifications are distinct because the Court has imposed standards on
regulatory takings that it has not imposed on physical appropriation
takings.243 For a regulatory taking to prevail, the claimant must show “all
economically beneficial uses” of the property interest were taken.244 So if an
inmate was not allowed to work or was not paid for his work, he will want
to argue that the taking of his labor was a regulatory taking.245 But if the
inmate was paid anything for his work, then, like in Horne where the raisin
owners retained an interest in the taken property but the Court said that they
were still entitled to just compensation, so too should the exoneree argue that
her work was physically appropriated and her retained interest in the vastly
inferior “wage” also does not equate to just compensation.246
3. When Did the Taking Occur?
To answer the question of when a taking occurred, First English

235

Id.
Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 684 (1888) (“[P]ursuing an ordinary calling or trade, and
of acquiring, holding, and selling property, is an essential part of . . . rights of liberty and property, as
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The court assents to this general proposition as embodying a
sound principle of constitutional law.”).
237
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391 (1898) (“As the possession of property, of which a person
cannot be deprived, doubtless implies that such property may be acquired, it is safe to say that a state law
which undertakes to deprive any class of persons of the general power to acquire property would also be
obnoxious to the same provision. Indeed, we may go a step further, and say that, as property can only be
legally acquired as between living persons by contract, a general prohibition against entering into contracts
with respect to property, or having as their object the acquisition of property, would be equally invalid.”).
238
Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 809.
239
Accord id.
240
See infra notes 243–46 and accompanying text.
241
See infra notes 243–46 and accompanying text.
242
See infra notes 243–46 and accompanying text.
243
Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 351, 377–88 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing
the case law and restrictions of regulatory takings).
244
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
245
See supra notes 243–44 and accompanying text. See also infra note 246 and accompanying text.
246
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 419, 441 (1982) (holding that
retaining any interest in a regulatory taking defeats a claim for just compensation).
236
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Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles gives guidance.247
In this case, a church owned land in a flood protection area.248 After flooding
occurred in the flood zone, the county passed an ordinance prohibiting
building within that zone. 249 In response to this restriction on the church’s
land, the church brought an inverse condemnation action.250 The ordinance
was subsequently invalidated, but the Supreme Court was asked if
compensation was required for the time the regulatory taking was in effect
before the invalidation.251 The Court held that the government was required to
pay for the temporary taking that occurred while the ordinance was in effect.252
This holding gives guidance as to the duration of the taking and whether
it commences when the imprisonment begins or from the time the conviction
is overturned and the exoneree is released.253 The county of Los Angeles in
First English believed it was acting in its rightful official capacity for the
public good by creating the flooding ordinance, much like a trial court that has
confidence in its conviction.254 However, once the Court in First English held
that the ordinance was invalid, the Supreme Court held Los Angeles County
liable for the appropriation from the time the ordinance was put into effect
until it was rescinded.255 Likewise, it follows that once due process vitiates a
wrongful conviction, the government also owes just compensation to the
exoneree from the time his work was first taken, even though at the initial time
of the taking the government believed it was acting in its rightful capacity.256
Case law supports the argument that a taking of an exoneree’s labor is
both a regulatory and appropriated taking, and thus, either way a court
chooses to analyze the claim, the taking should be justly compensated for.257
Therefore, just like the land regulated temporarily in First English, the
exoneree should be justly compensated for the whole time he was
247

482 U.S. 304, 304–05, 311 (1987).
Id. at 307.
249
Id.
250
Id. at 308, 316 (“While the typical taking occurs when the government acts to condemn property
in the exercise of its power of eminent domain, the entire doctrine of inverse condemnation is predicated
on the proposition that a taking may occur without such formal proceedings.”).
251
Id. at 308.
252
Id. at 318–19, 322 (“‘[T]emporary’ takings which, as here, deny a landowner all use of his
property, are not different in kind from permanent takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires
compensation.”).
253
See infra pp. 38–39.
254
First English, 482 U.S. at 321 (“Nothing we say today is intended to abrogate the principle that
the decision to exercise the power of eminent domain is a legislative function ‘for Congress and Congress
alone to determine.’ Once a court determines that a taking has occurred, the government retains the whole
range of options already available—amendment of the regulation, withdrawal of the invalidated
regulation, or exercise of eminent domain.”) (citation omitted).
255
Id. (“We merely hold that where the government’s activities have already worked a taking of all
use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide
compensation for the period during which the taking was effective.”).
256
Id.
257
Supra Section III.B.1–2.
248
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wrongfully incarcerated because his property—his labor—was regulated
and appropriated during that whole time.258
4. Was the Taking by Government Action, and Was It for the Public
Good?
Obviously, a criminal conviction results from government action, so this
is satisfied.259 Moreover, a vital pillar of the criminal justice system is that it
protects the public from harm.260 It is the whole system—from policing to
bringing charges to judging to imposing penalties—that falls under this
umbrella of protection by the government for the public good.261 While the
Fifth Amendment states a taking must be for “public use,” the Court has
consistently ruled that invasions and regulations for a public purpose or
benefit also satisfy the “public use” language of the Fifth Amendment.262
Criminal laws benefit the public, and therefore the government’s application
of those laws constitutes a “public use.”263 Thus, a person is imprisoned for
the public good, and when that imprisonment is found to be invalid, the
exoneree has experienced a taking of property—the value of his labor—for
the whole period of wrongful incarceration.264

258

See supra Section III.B.1–2.
U.S. Criminal Justice System, CORRECTIONALOFFICER.ORG, https://www.correctionalofficer.o
rg/us-criminal-justice-system (last visited Jan. 23, 2020); see also John Martinez, Wrongful Convictions
as Rightful Takings: Protecting “Liberty-Property”, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 515, 526 (2007) (discussing
wrongful conviction as a government action).
260
See An Overview of the 5 Objectives of the Criminal Justice System, ISFMA (Dec. 29, 2015),
https://www.isfma.com/insider-report/an-overview-of-the-5-objectives-of-the-criminal-justice-system/
(describing how the criminal justice system is set up to keep the public safe).
261
See Guide to the U.S. Criminal Justice System, CRIMINALJUSTICE.COM, https://www.criminalj
ustice.com/resources/guide-to-us-criminal-justice-system/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2021) (explaining the
scope of the criminal justice system).
262
See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 476 n.4, 489–90 (2005) (ruling a city’s plan to
condemn homes in a residential neighborhood and give the acreage to a private developer for $1 for a
ninety-nine-year lease to create an upscale development did not violate the Fifth Amendment’s
requirement that takings of property be for a “public purpose”); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S.
229, 245 (1984) (holding the property need not go to government hands to avoid a finding of private
use); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31–33, 36 (1954) (holding that a city’s plan to tear down a slum,
including a privately owned store, for city revitalization, even though some of the land was sold to private
developers, was for the public “purpose,” “welfare,” and “interest,” and because the plan was from the
legislature, it was also an appropriate use of police power); see generally Brent Nicholson & Sue Ann
Mota, From Public Use to Public Purpose: The Supreme Court Stretches the Takings Clause in Kelo v.
City of New London, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 81 (2005–06) (analyzing how modern takings jurisprudence has
evolved and expanded).
263
See supra Section III.B.1.
264
See supra Section III.B.1.
259
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C. The Way Forward
To have wrongful convictions recognized as a taking, “test cases”
brought in multiple jurisdictions are needed.265 Test cases require strategic
litigation across many circuits 266 and are designed to culminate before the
Supreme Court to seek a favorable ruling on a point in question, thus creating
binding precedent on all courts.267 The time is ripe for this issue to go before
the Court because of the recent public spotlight and outpouring of concern
over wrongful convictions.268
Historically, test cases have come under public scrutiny because critics
argue that these cases push the Court to rule in areas the Constitution did not
intend.269 However, that is distinctly not the issue here because a taking is a
protected constitutional right, and the jurisprudence leads logically to this
outcome.270 Further, the Founders viewed labor as property; therefore, this
argument satisfies an originalist, as well as a textualist, constitutional
interpretation.271 Critics also argue that when the Court rules where the
legislature should step in, the Court is not acting “for the people.”272 This
generally brings criticism about “activist judges” legislating from the

265

The most famous test case example is Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954)
(“We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”),
which culminated Charles Hamilton Houston’s twenty-year strategy to have the “separate but equal”
doctrine ruled unconstitutional in public education. J. Clay Smith, Jr., Forgotten Hero, 98 HARV. L. REV.
482, 488 (1984) (reviewing GENNA RAE MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (1983)). Methodically, Houston litigated for integration by starting
with graduate education and gradually working his way down to elementary school students. Id. His
strategy also included public campaigns to change the cultural view about segregation before asking the
courts to move in that direction. Id. It was this strategy that changed the country and paved the way for
the Supreme Court’s ruling that segregation was unconstitutional. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. Brown v.
Board of Education was won at the Supreme Court four years after Mr. Houston’s death. Smith, supra,
at 492.
266
Test Case, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM (May 29, 2018), https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-scienc
es-and-law/law/law/test-case (expounding on the history of test cases in American jurisprudence).
267
Id.
268
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
269
Jay Cost, The Supreme Court Has Been Making Policy, NAT’L REV. (July 16, 2018, 6:30 AM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/07/supreme-court-should-not-make-policy-not-what-foundersintended/.
270
See supra Section III.B.
271
See supra Sections III.A–B. See generally Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Methods of Interpreting the
Commerce Clause: A Comparative Analysis, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1185 (2003) for further reading on
constitutional interpretation. The opposite originalist argument could be made that the Founders did not
have in mind wrongful convictions as takings during the drafting of the Fifth Amendment. See generally
JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011) (discussing how modern-day jurists are not tied to what
the Founders believed).
272
Akhil Reed Amar, American Constitutionalism—Written, Unwritten, and Living, 126 HARV. L.
REV. F. 195, 201–03 (2013), https://harvardlawreview.org/2013/04/american-constitutionalism-writtenunwritten-and-living/.
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273

bench. This critique, however, is unwarranted on this issue because
thirty-seven states have already passed legislation for exoneration
compensation.274 Thus, a majority of the American people seem to have
spoken, and a ruling that says exactly that is merely judicial confirmation
promoting uniformity across the country.275
The time is also right due to the current makeup of the Supreme Court.276
Conservative justices typically rule in favor of protection of an individual’s
property rights, while liberal justices favor heightened criminal justice
reform.277 This issue gives the justices on both ideological sides a
compelling reason to rule for this as a taking.278
Concededly, a takings remedy may not be the most lucrative or desirable
remedy to an exoneree who has other available avenues for compensation.279
Instead, this remedy is, for the exonerees who are left behind without a
remedy from a state statute, a cause of action for wrongdoing or the political
pull to get a private bill passed.280 Takings actions do not provide a robust
damages remedy but merely just compensation and, therefore, typically may
not be as sizeable a remedy as alternative compensation schemes.281 Thus,
the argument is that this is a fallback remedy for those without another
option by setting a constitutional floor.282
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IV. IMPACT
Recognition of a wrongful conviction as a taking, thus requiring
compensation, would go a long way in helping to rebuild the lives of many
exonerees.283 If the Court does make this ruling, a natural next step would
be for Congress to use its Section 5 power under the Fourteenth Amendment
to legislate this just compensation so that exonerees will not have to litigate
their claims, but compensation would be automatic.284 For purposes of
justice and efficiency, this should be the goal once a taking is established.285
This ruling would also have far-reaching effects on society.286 It would
give exonerees an action to move forward for compensation that is certain
instead of the gambles that the current schemes necessitate.287 This right to
compensation would ensure that everyone who has suffered the “nightmare”
of which Judge Learned Hand spoke would not be freed into a continuing
nightmare of poverty but would have a way forward.288
Further, if law enforcement agencies, counties, and states know they are
going to be held financially accountable for wrongful convictions, they
would have an incentive to fix policies and procedures that lend themselves
to this problem.289 Fixing these problems is crucial because it is not just
wrongdoing that leads to wrongful convictions.290 Sometimes the problems
are less-than-credible line-up techniques, coercive interrogation methods, or
undue pressure to close a case, which is questionable but not legally liable
wrongdoing.291 All of these things lead to flawed due process that can be
avoided, and perhaps there would be more of an incentive if there was known
financial liability.292
It is easy to see how a fixed-compensation scheme could have some
unintended consequences.293 The fight for exoneration could be opposed
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harder, and governors could be less inclined to grant pardons. A recent
trend in prosecutors’ offices is to have a conviction integrity unit investigating
claims of innocence, but if the government knows it will be financially
responsible, it may be less inclined to help in the process of exoneration.295
Another possible negative result of this test case approach is that
litigation takes a long time.296 It is not a quick or inexpensive fix, and it is a
big gamble for the exonerees who choose to be the first to test the theory in
court.297 However, it is an option that has not yet been tried, and if it fails,
the exoneree will be no worse off than she is in the current system.298
CONCLUSION
This taking action will not be for everyone, but it will be the only answer
for some.299 For instance, exoneree Nathan Myers received $2 million in
compensation for his wrongful conviction; he will not need this.300 However,
his co-defendant exoneree Clifford Williams does because he received
nothing.301 Exoneree Timothy Atkins defied all odds by proving his
innocence, only to have the California Compensation Committee say he did
not qualify for compensation.302 Why? Because he ran from the police⎯a

294

Id. This could be especially problematic for elected judges and governors, who may feel pressure
about their election chances should they overturn a conviction the public views as correct.
295
Conviction Integrity Units, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/spec
ial/exoneration/Pages/Conviction-Integrity-Units.aspx (last visited Jan. 26, 2020). Cf. ABA Seeks Review
of Case Raising When Wrongly Convicted Person Can Seek Damages, A.B.A. (Jan. 13, 2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2020/01/aba-seeks-review-of-caseraising-when-wrongly-convicted-person-c/ (describing an amicus brief filed by the ABA that details an
alternative method of post-conviction relief: “[T]he ‘prosecutor’s office has conditioned the release of
an unlawfully convicted defendant on his agreement to a new plea—rather than vacating the prior
conviction before bringing any new charges.’ Prosecutors do this, the brief suggested, to insulate their
jurisdictions from paying civil monetary damages for wrongful incarcerations.”).
296
See generally INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., CIVIL CASE PROCESSING
IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 1 (2009), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/iaals_civil_c
ase_processing_in_the_federal_district_courts_0.pdf (analyzing the time it takes statistically to get a case
through the district courts).
297
See generally Gutman & Sun, supra note 287 (discussing how different state compensation laws
provide vastly different results for exonerees).
298
See supra Part II (discussing the current framework of wrongful conviction compensation).
299
See Miller, supra note 6 (explaining how some exonerees do not qualify for compensation in
any form).
300
Id.
301
Id. But see Laura Cassels, He Didn’t Do It: Exoneree Clifford Williams Files Claim for 43 Years
of Wrongful Incarceration, FLA. PHX. (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.floridaphoenix.com/2020/01/22/hedidnt-do-it-exoneree-clifford-williams-files-claim-for-43-years-of-wrongful-incarceration/ (explaining
a private bill that has been introduced in the Florida Legislature to compensate Clifford Williams; the
bill is currently pending).
302
Brooks & Simpson, supra note 164, at 650.

1018

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:4
303

fact that was not a contributing factor to his initial conviction. Mr. Atkins
needs this.304
A takings action is needed because almost half of all exonerees do not
qualify for compensation from their wrongful incarceration. 305 The current
exoneration compensation schemes—state statutes, civil lawsuits, and
private bills—leave too many people out.306
A wrongful conviction is the taking of an individual’s liberty and
property rights that due process failed to protect.307 It is then a second due
process, through the appeals process, that remedies the exoneree’s liberty
rights.308 Just compensation, however, is the constitutionally required
remedy for a taking of the exoneree’s property rights.309 An exoneree’s labor
is totally taken by regulation and physically appropriated upon incarceration,
and where property is totally regulated or appropriated, the Court says that
is a taking.310
If the Court recognizes wrongful conviction as a taking, it will truly be
the embodiment of the critical purpose of the Takings Clause: “to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which,
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”311 The
wrongfully convicted have borne those public burdens for far too long, and
it is beyond time that this wrong was righted.312
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